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ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of two separate papers where the first study examines performance in 
founder owned firms and the second assess how involved owners influence dividend payout 
policies. All our tests are based on an extensive data set that initially consists of 2671 firm-year 
observations, and includes 375 firms traded on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 
(Stockholmsbörsen), over the period 2001 - 2010.  
In the first study we use several regression analyses to study the effects of founder ownership on 
performance measured by Return on Net Operating Assets and Tobin‟s Q. Our findings support 
earlier research in that founder owned firms have a positive influence on performance. 
Additionally, to the best of our knowledge, we find novel evidence that indicate a somewhat 
exponential relationship between founder ownership and firm performance. When testing for 
founders who have positions as CEO, board member and/or chairman, we find that they have a 
slightly lower positive net effect on firm performance. Finally, we prove that founder owned 
firms perform better than firms who have long-term owners. To our understanding, this is also a 
novel empirical finding.  
In the second study we employ a model consisting of both Logit and Tobit regressions to test 
how firm owners with firm involvement through being a founder or long-term owner affect cash 
dividend payout policies. Our findings show that involved owners have more aggressive cash 
dividend policies than others. When examining different ownership involvement levels, we find 
that increased ownership involvement leads to more aggressive dividend payout policies. Finally, 
our results unexpectedly indicate that founder owners who are solely CEO have less aggressive 
payout preferences than others. These results do not only contribute to the sparse literature on 
how agency costs affect payout preferences, but are as far as we know, also novel empirical 
findings.    
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PAPER 1: PERFORMANCE IN FOUNDER OWNED FIRMS 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
A founder‟s role in creating successful companies is an interesting phenomenon that has 
attracted the interest of numerous researchers. Learning more about how different knowledge, 
psychological, emotional factors and agency costs affect performance can help stakeholders to be 
more susceptible to understand the correct information about what different types of ownership 
communicate.  
Some studies suggest that founders have a limited potential as managers and owners (c.f. 
Hambrick & Crozier (1985) and Rubenson & Gupta (1997)). However, more recent research 
attribute positive performance effects to these founders (c.f. Morck et al. (1988), Anderson & 
Reeb (2003), Arthurs & Busenitz (2003), Nelson (2003), Villalonga & Amit (2006), He (2008) 
and Florackis et al. (2009)). Based on this recent research, we expect to observe a positive 
relationship between founder owners and firm performance. 
In our study we use several definitions to describe different kinds of owners. In general, we 
define a founder as an individual who has created his own firm, in line with Begley & Boyd 
(1987).
1
 Thus, a founder who has voting power is defined as a founder owner. Operating 
founders are founders who hold positions as a CEO, chairman or ordinary board member or any 
combination of these. Finally, stockholders who are not founders and have been the largest firm 
owners over five years are referred to as long-term owners. 
Our tests are based on an extensive data set that initially consists of 2671 firm-year 
observations, and includes 375 firms traded on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 
(Stockholmsbörsen), over the period 2001 - 2010.  
We first introduce a model to test the relationship between firm performance and founder 
ownership. The results support existing literature in that founder owned firms have a positive 
influence on performance. Next, we decompose this model and test for different ownership 
                                                 
1
 We assume that descendants of the founder carry on the same values and characteristics as the original founder, 
and thus regard descendants as founders per se. 
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intervals derived from the findings of Morck et al. (1988) and Florackis et al. (2009) and find 
new evidence that indicate an exponential relationship between founder ownership and firm 
performance.  Second, we examine how stockholders who are operating founders affect firm 
performance. Here, the findings show that they have a slightly lower positive net effect on firm 
performance than founders who are solely owners. Finally, we compare the performance effects 
of founder ownership with long-term ownership, which proves that founder owned firms perform 
better than firms who have long-term owners. To the best of our knowledge, this is a novel 
empirical finding. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we derive three hypotheses from 
theory on founder ownership and performance. Section 3 highlights our research methodology. 
The empirical analysis is presented in section 4, including descriptive statistics, comparative 
statistics, correlation analyses and regression analyses. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper. 
2.0 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The current literature on founders‟ influence on firm performance is usually explained by 
agency theory, knowledge factors, and psychological and emotional factors. According to Morck 
et al. (1988), Villalonga & Amit (2006) and Florackis et al. (2009), two agency-based effects; the 
incentive-alignment and the entrenchment effect, explain how founders, and managers, affect 
firm performance. 
As explained by Florackis et al. (2009), founder or managerial ownership can help align the 
interests of managers and stockholders. The incentive-alignment effect suggests that a founder, 
or managerial owner, will be more prone to constraining the consumption of perquisites. On the 
other hand, at higher levels of ownership, founders and managers might use their position to 
harvest private benefits (the entrenchment effect). The entrenchment effect could in fact lead to a 
negative relationship between founder ownership and performance (Florackis et al., 2009). Even 
so, we must note that the empirical literature includes no general consensus on the exact nature 
of the relationships between managerial ownership and corporate performance. 
The incentive-alignment effect can be illustrated by examples from Jensen & Meckling 
(1976), Demsetz & Lehn (1985) and Anderson & Reeb (2003). If a founder owns a large share of 
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a company, his wealth will be linked to the performance of the company. This relationship gives 
founders strong incentives to monitor managers. The founders‟ long tenure also gives them 
superior knowledge about the firm‟s technology, which may improve the monitoring process 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Furthermore, Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Demsetz & Lehn (1985) 
argue that a greater concentration in ownership structure leads to less shirking incentives for the 
owners. The benefits of shirking apply only to the shirker (to spend his time and energy on other 
matters), while its costs (poorer firm performance) affect all owners. A more concentrated 
ownership structure then decreases the incentives for shirking since it maximizes the cost for the 
shirker. Additionally, as the founder‟s fraction of the firm equity increases, his predicted return 
also increases and thus functions as an incentive to improve his effort. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that a reduction in the founder‟s equity leads to reduced effort. According to 
Arthurs & Busenitz (2003) a founder who has invested substantial amounts of non-financial 
elements such as time, energy and “sweat equity” into the firm will view his ownership level as 
greater than the pure financial level. Even after several rounds of funding (resulting in the 
founder being diluted) the founder is still likely to feel that the firm is “his own”. Such a 
psychological ownership increases the probability that the founder will continue to offer large 
amounts of “sweat equity” to the firm. In these cases, a founder with influence on the firm will 
have a positive impact on the firm performance. 
Villalonga & Amit (2006) explains that the entrenchment effect typically becomes evident if 
one large stockholder has a controlling position in the firm. Such owners will in many cases use 
their controlling position to harvest private benefits at the expense of small stockholders. Given 
that the stockholder is an individual e.g. a founder, rather than an institution where control is 
spread out among several independent stockholders, incentives to both monitor and harvest 
private benefits are large. Additionally, Morck et al. (1988) states that care should be taken when 
trying to explain the entrenchment effect only based on voting power. They suggest that the 
founder‟s tenure with the firm, status as founder, and personality, can lead to entrenchment, even 
when the voting power is small. 
Founder, and managerial ownership, will in most cases reduce or eliminate agency conflicts 
between managers and owners. Thus, principal-agent theory would predict a positive effect on 
the value of founder management, as the incentive-alignment effect seems to dominate the 
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entrenchment effect.
2
 As a result of the mitigation of the classic agency problem, „founder 
operated firms‟ trade at a premium (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
In the empirical results of Florackis et al. (2009), the net effect of executive ownership on 
performance varies in relation to the level of ownership. Florackis et al. (2009) find that the net 
effect is significantly positive when ownership is below 15%. However, the relationship in the 
Florackis et al. (2009) study show some fluctuations in the interval between 15 - 60% ownership 
and a somewhat negative net effect of executive ownership on performance above 60% 
ownership.
3
 These results provide support for both the incentive-alignment and the entrenchment 
hypotheses. It seems as if the incentive-alignment effect dominates until managerial ownership 
reaches 15%. Between 15% and 60% the ownership-performance relationship acts somewhat 
fluctuating, suggesting that the alignment and entrenchment effect balance each other out. 
Finally, above 60% managerial ownership, the entrenchment effect appears to be presiding.  
These findings are supported by Anderson & Reeb (2003) who show that the firm performance 
first increases as founding-family ownership increases, but then decreases as the family 
ownership escalate. 
The findings of Florackis et al. (2009) are somewhat opposed by Morck et al. (1988). 
Consistently, they find that performance increases as the percentage of board ownership grow 
from 0% to 5%. However, in the interval 5% to 25% they find that the firm performance 
decreases. Morck et al. (1988) argue that even if the incentive-alignment effect is present in this 
interval, it is dominated by the entrenchment effect. Above 25% ownership, increased ownership 
results in better performance. Morck et al. (1988) draws the conclusion that the entrenchment 
effect reaches its maximum at 25% ownership, and thus the incentive effect dominates, leading 
to an increase in firm performance. 
Nevertheless, Jensen & Meckling (1976), Demsetz & Lehn (1985), Morck et al. (1988), 
Alvarez & Busenitz (2001), Anderson & Reeb (2003) and Villalonga & Amit, (2006) and 
Florackis et al. (2009) agree that founder owned firms most often perform better than other firms 
due to the positive incentive-alignment effect as opposed to the negative entrenchment effect. 
For this reason, we pose the following first hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
2
 Given that the founder is also an owner, which is true in most cases where we can identify a founder of the 
company. 
3
 In this measurement interval the number of observation is low. See Figure 1 and 5 in Florackis et al. (2009). 
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HYPOTHESIS 1 
Founder owned firms perform better than other firms.  
 
According to Nelson (2003), operating founders often own a larger percentage of the firm 
than non-founder managers. This creates an economic link between the founder and his firm and 
reduces the need for incentive compensation. This implies that the firm spend fewer resources on 
costly compensation, resulting in more resources being available for value creation activities, 
leading to better performance. In addition to this economic link, Nelson (2003) suggests that a 
psychological link exists between operating founders and the firm. This link reduces the agency 
costs related to managers‟ overconsumption of perquisites, as presented by Zimmerman (1979). 
The reduced overconsumption of perquisites also results in better performance. On the other 
hand, operating founders can become entrenched, even with small stakes, because of their 
psychological attachment to the firm (Morck et al., 1988). This would work against the positive 
performance effects. 
Research by Villalonga & Amit (2006) shows that operating founder firms have an 
estimated performance that is higher than firms with an externally hired CEO (and/or Chairman). 
This is equivalent with the findings of Anderson & Reeb (2003) who show that firms with 
„founder CEOs‟  display a higher profitability and market performance than „non-founder 
CEOs‟. Also according to Begley (1995), „founder CEOs‟ are more risk-taking and more likely 
to run firms with higher performance than non-CEO-founders. These findings strongly suggest 
that founder operated firms have higher performance than other firms.
4
 
Another explanation for the superior performance of founder operated firms might be that 
founders have better knowledge and skills than non-founders. According to Alvarez & Busenitz 
(2001), founders often embody firm-specific skills and capabilities that are potential sources for 
competitive advantage. They suggest that founders have a cognitive ability to more readily make 
sense out of uncertain and complex environments. Founders are therefore learning more quickly 
and make faster decisions, thus making them better at recognizing new opportunities. This view 
is supported by Morck et al. (1988), who state that the entrepreneurial ability of the founder can 
be a valuable asset to the firm, at least in its early life. In addition, the founders‟ long tenure 
                                                 
4
 Founder operated firms are defined as firms who have a founder-CEO, a founder board member (including 
chairman) or any combination of these. 
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gives them superior knowledge about the firm‟s technology (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). These 
founder-specific skills may improve the performance of founder operated firms. 
Following the argumentation for Hypothesis 1, founder owned firms should perform better 
than other firms. Since most founder operated firms are also firms where the founder is an 
owner, we find reason to believe that to have a real positive influence on the firm performance, 
the founder owner should be in an operating position. For these reasons, we pose the following 
second hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2 
Firms with the combination of founder ownership and operating founder perform better 
than firms where the founder is solely an owner. 
 
Several explanatory definitions exist regarding founders. By exploring these definitions, we 
can analyze in which areas and characteristics founders and long-term owners coincide. Livesay 
(1982) defines entrepreneurship as an activity intended to initiate, maintain, and develop a profit-
oriented business. Furthermore, Carland et al. (1984) distinguish between founders and non-
founders by stating that founders are interested in innovative efforts focused on long-term 
growth, whereas non-founders pursue personal goals. Similarly, both Johnson (1990) and Miner 
(1990) regard growth orientation a central feature in their definition of a founder. When we 
consider non-founder long-term owners, their goals are likely to be in line with the definitions of 
Livesay (1982), Carland et al. (1984), Johnson (1990) and Miner (1990). Hence, a non-founder 
long-term owner wants to initiate, maintain and develop a profit-oriented business, without 
sacrificing innovative efforts and long-term growth. 
According to He (2008), founders‟ long involvement in the creation and management of a 
firm enables them to accumulate specific knowledge about the firm. They suggest that this is one 
of the factors that leads to better performance for founder operated firms. An owner who follows 
the firm over a long period of time may accumulate the same knowledge and apply it in a 
beneficial way, thus also improving firm performance. As discussed by Nelson (2003), however, 
founders with ownership positions hold positions of higher influence more often than non-
founder owners. In short, founder owners involve themselves more in the operation of the firm 
than non-founder owners. Thus, non-founder long-term owners will have less influence to affect 
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the firm performance than founder owners due to professionally hired boards and a lower level 
of involved ownership. By including the effects related to a founder‟s “sweat equity”, we find 
reason to believe that the founder owner will outperform the non-founder long-term owner 
(Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003). For these reasons, we pose the following third hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3 
Founder owned firms perform better than firms with a non-founder long-term owner. 
3.0 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
3.1.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Our prime interest in this study is firm performance. Following previous literature, e.g. 
Adams et al. (2009), we use both an accounting based and capital market based measure of 
performance. Thus, we use Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA) and Tobin‟s Q (TQ) as our 
main dependent variables. One of the main advantages of using two measures when testing for 
firm performance is that a firm‟s accounting performance can differ strongly from its market 
performance. Firms in the biotech industry are good examples: they have high levels of 
innovation and R&D, but often limited sales. As a consequence, they usually have a high market 
performance as measured by TQ relative to their accounting performance as measured by RNOA. 
By including both these measures in our analysis, we are able to more thoroughly assess if 
founder owners influence firm performance.     
Both Gjesdal & Johnsen (1999) and Nissim & Penman (2003) argue that the purpose of 
profitability measurement in financial accounting is to measure the real value creation in the 
firm, not the value of total payouts. Furthermore, they argue that the most important aspect of 
profitability measurement is to make sure that the return on the capital that goes into the 
numerator is equal to the return on the capital that goes into the denominator. The traditional 
Return on Assets (ROA) measure does not satisfy this condition and must therefore be adjusted 
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in order to measure true firm performance.
5
 According to Nissim & Penman (2003), ROA 
includes financial assets in its base and excludes operating liabilities, so it confuses operating 
and financing activities. Gjesdal & Johnsen (1999) suggest that RNOA is a good measure for 
accounting performance since it is better at estimating performance related to operations.  
To calculate RNOA, we use the balance sheet identity and distinguish between operating and 
financial assets/liabilities in accordance with the method used by Dechow et al. (2008):  
Total assets equal the sum of total liabilities and equity (see eq. 1). We can divide total 
assets into cash and operating assets, which equals the sum of debt, operating liabilities and 
equity (see eq. 2). Net Operating Assets (NOA), which equals operating assets less operating 
liabilities, is then found as debt plus equity minus cash (see eq. 3). Finally, RNOA is calculated 
as operating profit divided by NOA (see eq. 4). 
 
Total assets = Total liabilities + Equity       (eq. 1) 
Cash + Operating assets = Debt + Operating liabilities + Equity    (eq. 2) 
NOA = Operating assets - Operating liabilities = Debt + Equity – Cash   (eq. 3) 
RNOA = Operating profit / NOA.        (eq. 4) 
  
Following Adams et al. (2009), we define Tobin‟s Q (TQ) as the ratio of the firm‟s market 
value of equity to its book value of equity (see eq. 5). The firm‟s market value is calculated as 
the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. The 
firm‟s book value is defined as the book value of assets.  
 
TQ = (Average book value of assets - Average book value of equity + Market value of equity four 
months after the end of the accounting period) / Average book value of assets  (eq. 5) 
3.1.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The main independent variable for the tests of the first hypothesis is founder ownership 
percentage (FoundOwn%); measured as the founder‟s percentage of voting rights in the firm. 
                                                 
5
 The Return on Assets (Net Income / Total Assets) measure includes the return on total investments, including those 
belonging to creditors (debt), owners (equity) and the government (taxes). The net income reported in the financial 
statement only account for earnings related to equity (i.e. owners). Thus there is an inconsistency between the 
numerator and the denominator. 
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Following Morck et al. (1988) and Florackis et al. (2009), we introduce ownership interval 
dummies to estimate how different levels of ownership influence performance. 
In the tests of the second hypothesis, our main test variable is a dummy that define whether 
the founder is an operating founder (OpFound). To be an OpFound, he has to be in a position of 
influence e.g. CEO, board member, chairman or any combination of these. Furthermore, we 
decompose the OpFound variable into board member (FoundBoard), CEO (FoundCEO), 
chairman (FoundChair), and the combinations of these (FoundCEOBoard and 
FoundCEOChair).  
Finally, to test the third hypothesis, we introduce the founder ownership dummy variable 
(FoundOwnDum) and a long-term owner dummy variable (LTO). FoundOwnDum is equal to one 
when the founder owns more than zero percent in the firm, while LTO is equal to one when the 
largest owner of the firm is not a founder and has been the largest owner for more than five 
years.  
3.1.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 
At the firm-level, we control for size (Size), risk (Risk), age (Age) and the intensity of 
intangible assets (IntA).
6
 Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm‟s average total 
assets. Risk is measured as the standard deviation of the stock return based on four different 
points of return within an interval of one year and three months on either side of the accounting 
period‟s end. Age is measured as the number of years since the founding of the firm. These three 
variables are meant to control for performance effects as a result of firm size, variability in stock 
return and survival time since founding.  
IntA is measured as the end of year value of intangible assets, scaled by end of year value of 
total assets and controls for an unnatural growth in RNOA. Additionally, by introducing a 
variable for the intensity of the intangible assets in the regressions for RNOA and TQ, we control 
for measurement errors as a result of using balance sheet data in the presence of mergers and 
acquisitions. In addition, we include 17 industry effect dummy variables and nine year effect 
dummy variables, to control for performance effects across different industries or years.
7
 
                                                 
6
 Additionally, we include FoundOwn% as a control variable in tests of Hypothesis 2. 
7
 Following Anderson & Reeb (2003), we exclude the financial industry, and thus, no dummy is needed for this 
industry. 
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3.2 RESEARCH MODELS 
3.2.1 HYPOTHESIS 1 
For Hypothesis 1, we first perform an OLS-regression to estimate how FoundOwn% 
influences performance.
8
 The FoundOwn% coefficients in regression models (1) and (4), α1 and 
ε1, represent the change in performance as a consequence of a change in ownership. If a positive 
(negative) coefficient is observed, we interpret this as if founder ownership influences 
performance positively (negatively). Thus, the incentive-alignment effect is stronger (weaker) 
than the entrenchment effect as the founder‟s ownership increases.  
                                                 
8
 The regression models (1 - 6) for Hypothesis 1 are presented in Table 7 in Section 4.5. 
Variables Symbol Definitions
Panel A: Depentent variables
Return on Net Operating Assets RNOA Accounting performance: Ratio of operating income to net operating assets
Tobin's Q TQ Market performance: Ratio of (book value of assets - book value of equity + market value of equity) to book value 
of assets
Panel B: Independent variables
Founder Ownership Percentage FoundOwn% The founder's percentage of ownership in the firm, where 100% equals 1
Florackis Ownership Interval 0-15 FoundOwn0-15 Equals 1 if a founder has an ownership position within the 0-15% ownership interval, and zero if not
Florackis Ownership Interval 15-60 FoundOwn15-60 Equals 1 if a founder has an ownership position within the 15-60% ownership interval, and zero if not
Florackis Ownership Interval 60-100 FoundOwn60-100 Equals 1 if a founder has an ownership position within the 60-100% ownership interval, and zero if not
Morck Ownership Interval 0-5 FoundOwn0-5 Equals 1 if a founder has an ownership position within the 0-5% ownership interval, and zero if not
Morck Ownership Interval 5-25 FoundOwn5-25 Equals 1 if a founder has an ownership position within the 5-25% ownership interval, and zero if not
Morck Ownership Interval 25-100 FoundOwn25-100 Equals 1 if a founder has an ownership position within the 25-100% ownership interval, and zero if not
Operating Founder OpFound Equals 1 if the founder has a position as CEO, a position on the board or any combination of these, and zero if not
Founder CEO FoundCEO Equals 1 if the founder is solely CEO, and zero if not
Founder Board FoundBoard Equals 1 if the founder is solely a member of the board, and zero if not
Founder CEO Board FoundCEOBoard Equals 1 if the founder is CEO and a member of the board, and zero if not
Founder Chairman FoundChair Equals 1 if the founder is solely chairman, and zero if not
Founder CEO Chairman FoundCEOChair Equals 1 if the founder is CEO and chairman, and zero if not
Founder with Ownership FoundOwnDum Equals 1 if the founder is an owner, and zero if not
Long Term Owner LTO Equals 1 if the largest owner of the firm has been the largest owner for more than five years, and zero if not
Panel C:  Control varables
Firm Size Size Natural logarithm of average total assets
Firm Age Age The number of years since the founding of the firm
Firm Risk Risk The standard deviation of the stock return based on four different points of return within an interval of one year 
and three months on either side of the accounting period's end
Intangible Assets IntA The end of year value of intangible assets scaled by the end of year value of total assets 
Year effects Year Nine year dummy variables set for the ten-year sample period
Industry effects Industry Seventeen industry dummy variables set for eighteen industries (excluding the financial industry)
TABLE 1
Variable definitions
11 
 
Additionally, we run OLS-regressions to estimate performance with the intervals from 
Florackis et al. (2009) as independent variables. The ranges of the intervals are respectively 0 - 
15%, 15 - 60% and 60 - 100% as illustrated in regression models (2) and (5). We also run similar 
regressions for performance with intervals from Morck et al. (1988) that range from 0 - 5%, 5 - 
25% and 25 - 100% as illustrated in regression models (3) and (6). An ownership interval 
variable is defined as 1 when a founder has an ownership position within the respective interval. 
As a consequence, the ownership interval coefficients measure how owners within that interval 
influence performance.  
The above ownership intervals might seem arbitrary, but are chosen to test whether the 
observed impact of the entrenchment and incentive-alignment effects on performance at specific 
levels of ownership (c.f. Florackis et al. (2009) and Morck et al. (1988)). Our result may provide 
support to either one or both of their findings. By examining where the results of the regressions 
on the different intervals align, we can present some general predictions of the relationship 
between founder ownership and the entrenchment and incentive-alignment effect.   
3.2.2 HYPOTHESIS 2 
When testing for Hypothesis 2, we run an OLS-regression on a sub-sample where we only 
include founder owners to estimate how operating founders (OpFound) influence performance.
9
 
The coefficients in regression models (7) and (9) in Table 8, π1 and φ1, measures how operating 
founders with ownership influence performance relative to non-operating founders with 
ownership. A positive (negative) coefficient indicates that the incentives of a founder owner in 
an operating position, and his ability to utilize skills and influence decisions, contribute to 
increased (decreased) firm performance. Also, by controlling for FoundOwn%, the test takes into 
account the potential added value of different levels of ownership. Consequently, if the 
magnitudes of the estimated size of the coefficients for the independent variables for OpFound 
(π1 and φ1) are positive, we accept Hypothesis 2.  
Finally, regression models (8) and (10) in Table 8 examines how founder owners in 
operating positions, e.g. CEO, board member, chairman, or any combination of these, impact 
corporate performance. 
                                                 
9
 The regression models (7 - 10) for Hypothesis 2 are presented in Table 8 in Section 4.6. 
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3.2.3 HYPOTHESIS 3 
To test Hypothesis 3 we perform an OLS-regression that estimates how founder owners and 
long-term owners influence firm performance.
10
 We first compare how founder owners and long-
term owners perform in general.
11
 The dummy variable FoundOwnDum equals 1 when a founder 
has ownership in the firm. The LTO variable is equal to 1 when the largest owner of the firm is 
not a founder, and has been the largest owner for five years or more.  
The coefficients, ψ1 (κ1) and ψ2 (κ2), in regression models (11) and (13) describe how 
founder owners and long-term owners influence RNOA (TQ) respectively. To test for Hypothesis 
3, we thus have to examine whether ψ1 (κ1) and ψ2 (κ2) are different.  
Second, we run another regression on a sub-sample to directly test whether founder owners 
perform better than long-term owners. By excluding the LTO variable, we take into account the 
possibility of multicollinearity as a result of a negative correlation between LTO and 
FoundOwnDum.
12
 If the estimated coefficients of the dummy variable FoundOwnDum (μ1 and 
τ1) in regression models (12) and (14) are positive, we have indeed demonstrated that founder 
owned firms perform better than firms with a non-founder long-term owner, and Hypothesis 3 
can be accepted. 
3.3 SAMPLE FORMATION 
The empirical tests are conducted using financial statements data and stock prices data from 
publicly listed companies in Sweden from 2001 to 2010, gathered by Ph.D. Mattias Hamberg, 
who is an associate professor at the Norwegian School of Economics. The data set originally 
consists of 375 firms and 2,671 firm-year observations.  
                                                 
10
 The regression models (11 - 14)  for Hypothesis 3 are presented in Table 9 in Section 4.7. 
11
 Since we lack data for long-term ownership percentage (LTO%), we have chosen not to use FoundOwn% 
percentage or LTO% as independent or control variables in the tests for Hypothesis 3. 
12
 The correlation between LTO and FoundOwnDum is -0.44. 
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3.3.1 DATA CLEANING 
In accordance with Anderson & Reeb (2003) we exclude banks due to the difficulty in 
calculating TQ for banks.
13
 We also exclude firms not domiciled in Sweden and those not 
reporting in Swedish kronor. In the process of cleaning the data set a total of 499 firm-year 
observations were excluded because of missing data, which leaves us with 2,172 firm-years 
before trimming. 
We decided to include a small amount of observations where the accounting period is longer 
than one year. We also decided to include firms in the first year they are listed although this 
means that stock returns have to be estimated on the basis of a shorter period than 12 months. 
None of these choices are likely to alter the bulk of our results. 
3.3.2 BIAS CONSIDERATION  
We have considered both hindsight bias and survival bias during our data selection process. 
Hindsight bias means that the information used should be available to the investors at the time an 
observation was made. Avoiding this bias has been an especially important consideration in our 
study. For that reason we have used market values four months after the end of the accounting 
period and returns estimated from three months after the accounting period ends, and continuing 
either 365 days or until the company's last day of trading.  
Survival bias arises when a researcher on purpose selects a population that has survived 
throughout the studied time- period and excludes the non-survivors. The appropriate procedure is 
to observe firms at one point in the past, and then follow them throughout the time period of 
concern. If they fall out of the sample during the sample period then we just exclude them on an 
“on the go” basis.  
Furthermore, studies which relate themselves to founder ownership, control, and 
management can be prone to self-selection biases (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Because all three 
elements are likely an outcome of endogenous decisions, the observed relation between each of 
them and firm value may be subject to alternative interpretations to value creation or destruction 
according to Villalonga & Amit (2006). For instance, when information asymmetries exist, 
founders may have incentives to reduce their equity stake if they believe their stock is 
                                                 
13
 We remove all observations with industry code 42 (Banks) from our initial data set. 
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overvalued or they foresee a substantial loss in value. Following Villalonga & Amit (2009), if 
this is the case, relationships we find between founder ownership and firm performance could be 
subject to a reverse causality interpretation. 
3.3.3 DATA TRIMMING  
The data set has been trimmed to control for outliers. Outliers are extreme observations that 
appear to be inconsistent with the rest of the data set. While stock returns are somewhat skewed, 
they should get fairly normal after trimming. Accounting information, on the other hand, tend to 
be less normally distributed. Possible consequences of not controlling for outliers could anyway 
be that the average of the sample becomes unrepresentative, the standard deviation increases and 
that the power of statistical tests goes down. Outliers can be identified by a graphical 
interpretation of the data.  
We trim separately on both RNOA and TQ at +1 and -1 to eliminate the influence of extreme 
outliers and to better satisfy the assumptions for linear regression. A total number of 
observations equal to 2% of each data set are removed.
14
 After trimming we were left with 2,128 
firm-year observations.  
We experienced that the standard error, kurtosis and skewness for all the three components 
improved significantly after trimming. The results are summarized in Table 2 underneath. 
The standard deviation, which is a measure of dispersion, has decreased for all variables. 
The skewness is a measure of the asymmetry of the probability distribution and a skewness level 
outside the interval -0.5 < Skewness < 0.5 is a good benchmark for suspecting skewness (Foster, 
1986). Accouning and performance measures are skewed by nature, but should get fairly normal 
after trimming. As we can see in the second and fourth column in Table 2, our data fit the 
assumptions of linear regression better after trimming, but they are still slightly skewed. This 
skewness could weaken regression results somewhat. However, the absolute skewness from 
before to after trimming is improved remarkably for TQ. 
 
                                                 
14
 We operate one data set after trimming per dependent variable. Thus, we have one data set for RNOA and one for 
TQ.  
15 
 
 
The kurtosis measures the “thickness” of the tales (Foster, 1986). Kurtosis is zero under the 
normal distribution, and a kurtosis level outside the interval – 1 < Kurtosis < 1 is a good rule of 
thumb for suspecting “fat tails”. The kurtosis has been reduced by more than 385 points for 
RNOA and more than 535 points for TQ. Hence, trimming has improved the data to better fit the 
assumptions necessary to run basic statistics.
15
 
3.3.4 SAMPLES 
We use the whole sample of 2,128 firm-year observations to test Hypothesis 1. To test 
Hypothesis 2, we exclude all observations where a founder does not exist and where founders are 
not owners, leaving us with a total of 993 firm-year observations. In the testing of Hypothesis 3, 
we exclude all observations where we do not have a founder owner or long-term owner, leaving 
us with a total of 1,377 firm-year observations.   
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 Accounting information is considerably less normally distributed than stock returns and one would normally not 
expect the descriptive statistics to perfectly fit the basic assumptions of linear regression.  
Before After Before After
Mean 0.04 0.04 1.59 1.82
Standard Deviation 3.15 0.55 6.87 1.39
Kurtosis 401.46 12.42 549.06 8.47*
Skewness 2.17** -1.74** -20.69 2.34**
* -5.0 < Skewness < 5.0 or -10 < Kurtosis < 10
**   -2.5 < Skewness < 2.5 or -5 < Kurtosis < 5
***     -0.5 < Skewness < 0.5 or -1 < Kurtosis < 1
TABLE 2
Change in Standard Deviation, Skewness and Kurtosis
from cleaned data to trimmed data.
RNOA TQ
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4.0 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Table 3 gives a general overview of how many founder, sub-category founder and long-term 
owner observations that are observed in our data sets. Panel A shows that 993 of the 2,128 firm-
year observations (46.7%) have a founder with some sort of ownership in the firm. In line with 
n % Mean RNOA Mean TQ
Panel A: Total Sample Overview
Sample 1: Full Sample 2128 100% 0.038 1.823
Sample 2: FoundOwnDum 993 46.7 % 0.011 2.038
Sample 3: FoundOwnDum + LTO 1,377 64.7 % 0.034 1.900
Panel B: Ownership Intervals Observations
Florackis intervals
FoundOwn 0-15% 272 12.8 % -0.321 2.291
FoundOwn 15-60% 500 23.5 % 0.080 1.922
FoundOwn 60-100% 221 10.4 % 0.265 1.988
Morck intervals
FoundOwn 0-5% 116 5.5 % -0.312 2.180
FoundOwn 5-25% 289 13.6 % -0.157 2.220
FoundOwn 25-100% 588 27.6 % 0.158 1.921
Panel C: Operating Founder Observations*
OpFound 814 38.3 % 0.010 1.917
FoundCEO 22 1.0 % 0.097 1.572
FoundBoard 322 15.1 % -0.074 2.003
FoundCEOBoard 201 9.4 % 0.087 1.984
FounderChair 214 10.1 % 0.075 1.818
FoundCEOChair 55 2.6 % -0.068 1.695
Panel D: Long Term Owner Observations
LTO 384 18.0 % 0.095 1.538
TABLE 3
Number of observations and average RNOA and Tobin's Q
for the different categories.
The number of observations is based on the the RNOA data set. The observations for the TQ data set does not differ much 
however. The RNOA and TQ mean values are based on the RNOA data set and the TQ data set respectively.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
*The descriptive data for OpFound are based on the FoundOwnDum sample. The sub-categories for founder operative are 
all mutually exclusive observations. Accordingly, their sum is equal to the operating founder variable. All other descriptive 
data are calculated from the main sample of 2128 observations.  
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the expectations from Hypothesis 1, the means of RNOA (0.038) and TQ (1.823) are positive. 
However, the mean RNOA (0.038) for the full sample is larger than the mean RNOA (0.011) for 
sample two, where we only include founder owners. This somewhat contradicts Hypothesis 1, 
but we should keep in mind that RNOA and TQ are not industry mean adjusted. This proves the 
need for tests using linear regression with industry effect control variables. 
In Panel B in Table 3, we have summarized the number of founder owners included in each 
of the ownership intervals that we use in our regressions later on. The means of RNOA and TQ 
for the different intervals imply the same pattern as described later in Table 6. 
Panel C in Table 3 display that 814 observations  from sample two, where only founder 
owners are included, have a founder in an operating position e.g. CEO, a position on the board, 
or a combination of these. The observations related to the founder operating positions are 
binomial and mutually exclusive. In descending magnitude, the number of observations is 322 
for founder board members, 214 for founder chairmen
16
, 201 for combined founder-CEO board 
members, 55 for combined founder-CEO chairmen and 22 for founder-CEOs. The low number 
of observations for FoundCEO and FoundCEOChair might result in weak statistical significance 
in the statistical tests.  
Finally, Panel D in Table 3 shows that 18% of the data set consists of long-term owners who 
are not founders and have held their majority positions continuously for more than five years. 
4.2 COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 4 presents comparative descriptive statistics for founder and non-founder owned 
firms. The table‟s third column shows p-values from two-tailed t-tests to reject the null 
hypothesis of equal means across these two groups. 
In Panel A of Table 4 we report the means of the performance variables RNOA and TQ. In 
this univariate analysis, we find that RNOA and TQ seems to be significantly different for 
founder owned and non-founder owned firms. There are tendencies indicating that the 
performance for TQ in founder owned firms is higher than non-founder owned firms. However, 
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 Founder chairmen are also board members, but are not included in the founder board member variable, since each 
founder operating variable is mutually exclusive. 
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the conflicting tendency for RNOA proves once again the need for linear regressions controlled 
for industry effects. 
 
 
Panel B of Table 4 compares the mean of the firm characteristics for founder owned and 
non-founder owned firms. As expected, all four variables are significantly different. The means 
of Size, Age and IntA seems to be smaller for founder owned firms than non-founder owned 
firms. Furthermore, we unsurprisingly observe higher Risk for founder owned firms than for 
other firms. Since all the firm characteristics variables are significantly different, they are 
suitable as control variables in the subsequent formal tests. 
4.3 CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables used in the 
analysis for the pooled sample of both founder owned and non-founder owned firms. The table 
shows that a founder‟s ownership percentage is associated with both higher RNOA (t-stat: 6.10) 
and TQ (t-stat: 2.75). OpFound is positively associated with TQ (t-stat: 1.99) and negatively 
associated with RNOA (t-stat: -1.89). Additionally, OpFound shows a positive correlation with 
FoundOwn% (t-stat: 38.98) which indicates that many of the founders in operating positions (e.g. 
Founder-owned firms Non-founder-owned firms T-test 
Mean Mean P-value
Panel A: Performance Variables
RNOA 0.011 0.061 0.039
TQ 2.038 1.633 0.000
Panel B: Firm Characteristics
Size 6.814 7.888 0.000
Age 49.257 68.411 0.014
Risk 0.431 0.380 0.004
IntA 0.161 0.209 0.000
All firm characteristics means in panel B are based on the data set where RNOA is trimmed. 
TABLE 4
Comparative descriptive data for Founder-owned firms
and Non-founder-owned firms
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CEO, board member and/or chairman) also are owners. The level of correlation leads us to 
suspect multicollinearity between OpFound and FoundOwn%, which could hinder attempts to 
explain whether it is founder ownership or operating founders that drives performance.
17
 This 
correlation is greatly reduced in the sub-sample, as opposed to the full sample.
18
 Thus, we take 
the possibility of multicollinearity that we observe in the full sample into account when testing 
for Hypothesis 2.  
OpFound does not have a positive correlation with RNOA; however, FoundCEO, 
FoundCEOBoard and FoundChair show a positive association with RNOA (t-stats: 0.58, 1.24 
and 0.67 respectively). FoundBoard, FoundCEOBoard, FoundChair and FoundCEOChair have 
positive correlations with ownership percentage (t-stats: 12.54, 15.93, 13.82 and 7.96 
respectively) but lower than for the operating founder category as a whole. Finally, long-term 
owners who are not founders and have held their majority positions continuously for five years 
or more are associated with higher RNOA (t-stat: 2.25) and lower TQ (t-stat: -4.44).  
Size is associated with higher RNOA (t-stat: 11.64) and lower TQ (t-stat: -9.53). Age is 
associated with higher TQ (t-stat: 2.20). Risk is negatively associated with RNOA (t-stat: -6.99). 
IntA is associated with higher TQ (t-stat: 2.57).  
Since FoundOwn% is associated with both higher RNOA and TQ, we include a correlation 
matrix of how different ownership intervals are associated with performance in Table 6. Earlier 
in the paper, we refer to the findings of both Florackis et al. (2009) and Morck et al. (1988) who 
have ideas on how the entrenchment effect and the incentive-alignment effect affect performance 
at varying points of ownership. We use their respective ownership intervals to analyze which of 
the two studies our data is most similar to. 
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 We suspect multicollinearity between variables when the correlation coefficient is larger than 0.40. (Also see 
Section 3.3.2.) 
18
 The correlation between OpFound and FoundOwn% in the full sample is 0.65 (see Table 5). However, in the sub-
sample used to test for Hypothesis 2, the correlation is 0.20. 
20 
 
1
§
2
§
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 RNOA 1
2 TQ 0.01 1
3 FoundOwn% 0.13*** 0.06*** 1
4 FoundOwnDum -0.04* 0.15*** 0.72*** 1
5 OpFound -0.04* 0.04** 0.65*** 0.79*** 1
6 FoundCEO 0.01 -0.02 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.14***
†
1
7 FoundBoard -0.08*** 0.04** 0.26*** 0.40***
†
0.54*** -0.05** 1
8 FoundCEOBoard 0.03 0.03 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.41***
†
-0.04* -0.15*** 1
9 FoundChair 0.01 0.00 0.29*** 0.35*** 0.41*** -0.04* -0.15*** -0.11*** 1
10 FoundCEOChair -0.03 -0.02 0.17***
†
0.17***
†
0.20*** -0.02 -0.07*** -0.05**
†
-0.05**
†
1
11 LTO 0.05** -0.10*** -0.32*** -0.44*** -0.39*** -0.05** -0.21*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.08*** 1
12 Size 0.24*** -0.20*** -0.03 -0.28***
†
-0.19*** -0.01 -0.09*** -0.14*** -0.03 -0.04* 0.33*** 1
13 Age 0.03 0.05** -0.06***
†
-0.05** -0.15*** -0.02 -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.04* 0.09*** 0.02
†
1
14 Risk -0.15*** 0.03 -0.02
†
0.06*** 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05** -0.04* 0.02 -0.07*** -0.13***
†
0.06***
†
1
15 IntA -0.01 0.06** -0.21***
†
-0.12***
†
-0.09***
†
0.03 0.01 -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.04* -0.11*** 0.04
†
0.08***
†
1
*      Denote significant at 10% level
**    Denote significant at 5% level
***  Denote significant at 1% level
§
 Column 1 (RNOA) and 2 (Tobin's Q) contain data from the full sample data sets where we trim on  RNOA and Tobin's Q  respectively. The remaining correlation columns in the correlation matrix contain descriptive data for the data set where 
we trim on the RNOA variable.
†
  These correlation coefficients differ from the data set where we trim on Tobin's Q. The difference is no more than 0.01 and the significance level is unchanged between the two data sets.
TABLE 5
Correlation Matrix
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In Panel A of Table 6 we present ownership intervals that are derived from Florackis et al. 
(2009). Low levels of ownership (0 - 15 %) have a negative association with RNOA (t-stat: -
11.89) and a positive association with TQ (t-stat: 6.01). This difference in correlation with 
performance seems somewhat odd, as we would expect them to point in similar directions. Both 
in the mid-range of founder ownership (15 - 60 %) and the high levels of ownership (60 - 100%), 
there is a positive association with both RNOA (t-stats: 1.97 and 6.55 respectively) and TQ (t-
stats: 1.82 and 1.91 respectively).  
In Panel B of Table 6, we show the ownership intervals from Morck et al. (1988). Very low 
(0 - 5%) and mid-range (5 - 25%) levels of founder ownership have a negative association with 
RNOA (t-stats: -7.12 and -6.54 respectively). High levels of ownership show a positive 
association with RNOA (t-stat: 6.29). Both very low levels of ownership (0 - 5%) and higher 
levels of ownership (25 - 100%) have a small positive association with TQ (t-stats: 2.88 and 2.02 
respectively). Mid-range (5 - 25%) levels of ownership also have a positive association with TQ 
(t-stat: 5.26). Again, some odd differences in the correlation for RNOA and TQ with performance 
are observed.  
 
 
When comparing our ownership intervals and performance correlations with the ideas 
presented by Florackis et al. (2009) and Morck et al. (1988), we find more similarities with 
RNOA TQ
Panel A: Ownership Intervals - Florackis
FoundOwn 0-15% -0.250*** 0.129***
FoundOwn 15-60% 0.043** 0.039*
FoundOwn 60-100% 0.141*** 0.041*
Panel B: Ownership Intervals - Morck
FoundOwn 0-5% -0.153*** 0.062***
FoundOwn 5-25% -0.140*** 0.113***
FoundOwn 25-100% 0.135*** 0.044**
*      Denote significance at 10% level
**    Denote significance at 5% level
***  Denote significance at 1% level
TABLE 6
Correlation Matrix Florackis & Morck Intervals
The Florackis and Morck values signals the ownership intervals derived from Florackis et al. (2009) and 
Morck et al. (1988) in relation to the incentive alignment effect and the entrenchment effect. 
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Morck et al. (1988) who state that at high levels of ownership the incentive-alignment effect 
overshadow the entrenchment effect. Thus, we should expect higher performance at higher levels 
of founder ownership. Correlations at lower and mid-range levels of ownership do not have a 
distinct pattern and cannot directly be associated with the ideas derived by either Morck et al. 
(1988) or Florackis et al. (2009). 
4.4 CONTROL VARIABLE ANALYSIS 
The coefficients for the control variables mentioned in this analysis can be found in Table 7, 
Table 8 and Table 9 below. The coefficients for Size, Age and IntA show the same positive 
association in all the regressions for RNOA. It seems as if larger and older firms have better 
accounting performances than other firms. Also firms with a large amount of intangible assets 
(IntA) should report higher RNOA than other firms, since intangible assets are not included in 
operating assets. Risk has a negative influence on RNOA.
19
   
Also in our regressions for TQ, all the respective control variable coefficients show the same 
patterns. Age and Risk have a positive influence on TQ. Logically, older firms and firms with a 
higher variation in their market returns give a higher market performance. Size and IntA have a 
negative association with TQ. Since the TQ measure is the sum of market value of equity and 
book value of debt divided by book value of assets, our size measure, which is based on book 
value of assets, will naturally influence TQ negatively as Size increases. Finally, since TQ is a 
market performance measure, intangible assets, e.g. goodwill as a result of a merger, is already 
included in the market valuation of the firm. Since the market usually values IntA lower than its 
book value, the negative relationship between IntA and TQ is reasonable. 
4.5 TEST OF HYPOTHESIS 1 
Our first hypothesis is that firms owned by founders perform better than other firms. Table 7 
summarizes the tests for Hypothesis 1. Column one shows the regression of RNOA on founder 
ownership percentage. The coefficient of founder ownership percentage, α1, is 0.312 (t-stat: 6.78) 
and indicates that higher founder ownership improves accounting profitability (i.e., RNOA). This 
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 One should keep in mind that our measure of risk is not related to accounting performance, but to market returns.  
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result supports the prediction in Hypothesis 1. Additionally, column four displays the regression 
of TQ on founder ownership. The ownership percentage coefficient, ε1, is 0.508 (t-stat: 4.62) and 
implies that greater founder ownership is related to a larger TQ and thereby improved market 
performance. Consequently the result in column five coincides with the outcome of the RNOA 
regression and thereby confirms the prediction in Hypothesis 1.   
As a conclusion, Table 7 provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. In line with the 
hypothesis, founder owned firms have a positive influence on performance and thus, the 
incentive-alignment effect should overshadow the entrenchment effect. For these reasons, we 
accept Hypothesis 1. 
 
 
RNOA (1) t =  α 0 + α 1 FoundOwn% t + α 2 Size t  + α 3 Age t  + α 4 Risk t  + α 5 IntA t  + υ t
RNOA (2) t =  β 0 + β 1 FoundOwn0-15 t + β 2 FoundOwn15-60 t  + β 3 FoundOwn60-100 t  +  β 4 Size t  + β 5 Age t  + β 6 Risk t  + β 7 IntA t  + υ t
RNOA (3) t =  γ 0 + γ 1 FoundOwn0-5 t + γ2 FoundOwn5-25 t  + γ 3 FoundOwn25-100 t  +  γ 4 Size t  + γ 5 Age t  + γ 6 Risk t  + γ 7 IntA t  + υ t
Tobin's Q (4) t   =  ε0  +ε 1 FoundOwn% t  + ε 2 Size t  + ε 3 Age t  + ε 4 Risk t + ε 5 IntA t  + ε t
Tobin's Q (5) t =  η 0 + η 1 FoundOwn0-15 t + η 2 FoundOwn15-60 t  + η 3 FoundOwn60-100 t  +  η 4 Size t  + η 5 Age t  + η 6 Risk t  + η 7 IntA t  + υ t
Tobin's Q (6) t =  θ 0 + θ 1 FoundOwn0-5 t + θ 2 FoundOwn5-25 t  + θ 3 FoundOwn25-100 t  +  θ 4 Size t  + θ 5 Age t  + θ 6 Risk t  + θ 7 IntA t  +  υ t
RNOA (1) RNOA (2) RNOA (3) Tobin's Q (4) Tobin's Q (5) Tobin's Q (6)
Constant -0.445 (-4.91)*** -0.403 (-4.39)*** -0.400 (-4.34)*** 1.116 (5.08)*** 1.028 (4.60)*** 1.019 (4.55)***
Independent variables
FoundOwn% 0.312 (6.78)*** 0.508 (4.62)***
Florackis intervals
FoundOwn 0-15% -0.149 (-3.92)*** 0.233 (2.53)**
FoundOwn 15-60% 0.119 (4.14)*** 0.214 (3.08)***
FoundOwn 60-100% 0.210 (5.44)*** 0.461 (5.02)***
Morck intervals
FoundOwn 0-5% -0.136 (-2.61)*** 0.247 (1.98)***
FoundOwn 5-25% -0.037 (-1.04) 0.259 (2.98)***
FoundOwn 25-100% 0.166 (6.07)*** 0.299 (4.54)***
Control variables
Size 0.047 (6.93)*** 0.042 (6.07)*** 0.043 (6.18)*** -0.063 (-3.85)*** -0.053 (-3.18)*** -0.052 (-3.13)***
Age 0.000 (1.68)* 0.000 (1.54) 0.000 (1.81)* 0.001 (3.49)*** 0.001 (3.44)*** 0.001 (3.39)***
Risk -0.144 (-4.88)*** -0.135 (-4.61)*** -0.139 (-4.69)*** 0.143 (1.98)** 0.139 (1.92)* 0.134 (1.85)*
IntA 0.158 (2.40)** 0.148 (2.26)** 0.157 (2.39)** -0.512 (-3.23)*** -0.506 (-3.20)*** -0.511 (-3.21)***
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
-adjusted 17.1% 18.0% 17.4% 24.4% 24.7% 24.4%
N 2128 2128 2128 2128 2128 2128
*      Denote significance at 10% level
**    Denote significance at 5% level
***  Denote significance at 1% level
T-statistic is denoted in brackets
TABLE 7
Results from Ordinary Least Square Regressions of Return On Net Operating Assets and Tobin's Q on Founder Ownership (t-statistics in parenthesis)
Sample Consists of 2128 Firm-years from 2001 to 2010
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To further examine the relationship between founder ownership and performance we look at 
how the different ownership intervals are associated with performance. We select ownership 
intervals that are in line with the ideas presented by Florackis et al. (2009) and Morck et al. 
(1988). The intervals they derive are based on hypotheses on how the entrenchment effect and 
the incentive-alignment effect affect performance at varying points of ownership.  
The regressions of performance on the founder ownership intervals are summarized in Table 
7. Column two shows the regression for RNOA on the ownership intervals derived through 
Florackis et al. (2009). The coefficient on low ownership levels, β1, is -0.149 (t-stat: -3.92), 
which indicates a negative relationship between RNOA and ownership. This would imply that the 
entrenchment effect dominates the incentive-alignment effect at low levels of ownership. In 
contrast, the coefficient on medium levels of ownership, β2, is 0.119 (t-stat: 4.14) and thus 
positive. The same applies for the coefficient on high levels of ownership, β3, which is 0.210 (t-
stat: 5.44). This signals that the incentive-alignment effect overshadows the entrenchment effect 
at both medium and high levels of ownership.  Furthermore, β3 is larger than β2, which implies 
that the performance effect is greater at higher ownership levels. 
In addition, column five displays the corresponding regression for TQ. The coefficient on 
low ownership levels, η1, is 0.233 (t-stat: 2.53) and signals a positive relation between TQ and 
founder ownership. Our interpretation is that the incentive-alignment effect dominates the 
entrenchment effect at low levels of ownership. The coefficient on medium levels (15 - 60%) of 
ownership, η2, is 0.214 (t-stat: 3.08). Similarly, the coefficient on high levels (60 - 100%) of 
ownership, η3, is 0.461 (t-stat: 0.461). Thus, like the regression for RNOA, the incentive-
alignment effect dominates the entrenchment effect at medium (15 - 60%) and high (60 - 100%) 
ownership levels. As η3 is larger than η2, the performance effect is larger for higher levels of 
ownership, in accordance with the results of the regression of RNOA. However, it seems as if the 
market performance, TQ, remains high at low (0 - 15%) levels of founder ownership even though 
the accounting performance, RNOA, is negative.  
Column three shows the regression for RNOA on the ownership intervals derived through 
Morck et al. (1988). The coefficient at low levels of ownership, γ1, is -0.136 (t-stat: -2.61) and 
support the results of the regression on low level interval derived through Florackis et al. (2009). 
While, the coefficient for medium levels of ownership, γ2, is slightly negative (-0.037), it is not 
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significant. Finally, the coefficient at high level of ownership, γ3 is 0.166 (t-stat: 6.07), which 
indicates a positive association with RNOA.  
The coefficients of the corresponding regression for TQ in column six displays a similar 
pattern as the regression based on the intervals derived through Florackis et al. (2009) on both 
medium and high levels of ownership. However, the regression in column six indicates that 
FoundOwn0-5% has a positive influence on TQ. Again, it seems as if the market performance, 
TQ, remains high at low levels (0 - 5% and 5 - 25%) of founder ownership even though the 
accounting performance, RNOA, is negative. 
By combining the insights gained from the regressions in columns two, three, five and six, 
we can confirm that the association between founder ownership and performance is positive at 
levels above 15%.  At levels lower than 15%, founder owners seem to have a negative influence 
on RNOA.
20
 However, the real effect of founder ownership on performance at founder ownership 
levels under 15% is indecisive, as TQ is positively influenced by founder ownership at these 
levels.  
All in all, the regressions on different ownership intervals confirm the findings of the 
regressions from equation one and four (in Table 7) and supports Hypothesis 1. However, instead 
of a direct linear relationship between founder ownership percentage and performance, we find 
evidence that indicate a somewhat more exponential relationship. Our regression results 
demonstrate that the coefficients of the ownership intervals are larger at higher levels of 
ownership. Thus, the incentive-alignment effect increases its supremacy over the entrenchment 
effect as the founder ownership percentage rise. 
Our findings from Hypothesis 1 give some new and important general insights. When 
comparing our results with the research of Villalonga & Amit (2006), who find that founder-
CEO firms trade at a premium relative to other firms, we observe that all founder owned firms 
trade at a premium relative to other firms.
21
  
Additionally, our findings support Arthurs & Busenitz (2003) in that a reduction in founder 
equity does not directly lead to reduced effort. We show that founder owned firms have positive 
influence on accounting and market performance at ownership levels above 15%. This effect is 
                                                 
20
 However, the real cutoff can in fact be even lower than 15%. 
21
 Positive coefficients for founder ownership percentage and intervals in all the TQ-regressions are presented in 
Table 7. 
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most likely related to the founder‟s psychological attachment to his firm, also known as “sweat 
equity”, which leads to an increased effort for the founder.  
As time passes, however, the founder‟s firms are subject to even more external funding, 
issues and IPO‟s, and founder ownership might fall below 15%. Interestingly, we find that the 
accounting performance, RNOA, at these low levels is negative. It seems as if the founder‟s 
incentives not to shirk and harvest private benefits at high ownership levels are lost when a 
certain amount of ownership or psychological attachment is gone.  
Furthermore, we find that the market performance, TQ, is positive even when founder 
ownership falls below 15%. This means that a founder owned firm, which has a negative 
relationship with accounting performance actually still trade at a “founder premium”, i.e. the 
market still values the founder owned firm higher than other firms even though their financial 
statements show that they have a weaker performance.  
4.6 TEST OF HYPOTHESIS 2 
Our second hypothesis is that firms with the combination of founder ownership and 
operating founder perform better than firms where founders are solely owners. First, we analyze 
how operating founders with ownership influence firm performance compared to non-operating 
founders who are owners. Second, we split up the operating founder variable into operating 
positions e.g. CEO, board member or chairman.  
The tests for Hypothesis 2 are summarized in Table 8. Column one in Table 8 demonstrates 
the regression for RNOA (7) on founder operating ownership. While the coefficient of the 
OpFound variable, π1, is negative (-0.062), it is not significant. But given that it is negative, we 
suspect that founders with dual operating and ownership positions have a somewhat lower 
influence on RNOA than founders who are simply owners. Moreover, the regression for TQ (9) 
in column three proves the same relationship as observed for RNOA above. The coefficient φ1 is 
-0.345 (t-stat: -2.54). These findings challenge Hypothesis 2 and suggest that firms that are 
owned and operated by the same founder do not perform better than founder owned, but not 
founder operated, firms.  
The control variable, FoundOwn%, indicates that most of the positive performance effect of 
being a founder owner can be related to increasing levels of ownership. In that matter, it seems 
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as if the incentive-alignment effect still overshadow the entrenchment effect as the founder 
operating ownership percentage rise. However, founder owners who also take on excess 
responsibilities in the firm through operating positions seems to be more entrenched.  
 
 
To further analyze the relationship between operating ownership and performance we 
decompose the operating founder variable into FoundCEO, FoundBoard, FoundCEOBoard, 
FoundChair and FoundCEOChair. All coefficients, except for FoundCEOBoard, show a 
RNOA (7) t =  π 0 + π 1 OpFound t + π 2 FoundOwn% t  +  π 3 Size t  + π 4 Age t  + π 5 Risk t  + π 6 IntA t  + υ t
RNOA (8) t =  ρ 0 + ρ 1 FoundCEO t + ρ 2 FoundBoard t  + ρ 3 FoundCEOBoard t  + ρ 4 FoundChair t   + ρ 6 FoundCEOChair t  + ρ 7 FoundOwn% t + ρ 8 Size t 
              + ρ 9 Age t  + ρ 10 Risk t  + ρ 11 IntA t  + υ t
Tobin's Q (9) t =  φ 0 + φ 1 OpFound t + φ 2 FoundOwn% t  +  φ 3 Size t  + φ 4 Age t  + φ 5 Risk t  + φ 6 IntA t  + υ t
Tobin's Q (10) t =  χ 0 + χ 1 FoundCEO t + χ 2 FoundBoard t  + χ 3 FoundCEOBoard t  + χ 4 FoundChair t   + χ 6 FoundCEOChair t  + χ 7 FoundOwn% t + χ 8 Size t 
              + χ 9 Age t  + χ 10 Risk t  + χ 11 IntA t  + υ t
RNOA (7) RNOA (8) Tobin's Q (9) Tobin's Q (10)
Constant -0.497 (-3.04)*** -0.470 (-2.83)*** 1.113 (2.70)*** 1.158 (2.76)***
Independent variables
OpFound
†
-0.062 (-1.14) -0.345 (-2.54)**
FoundCEO -0.031 (-0.23) -0.465 (-1.36)
FoundBoard -0.129 (-2.19)** -0.272 (-1.83)*
FoundCEOBoard 0.030 (0.45) -0.454 (-2.72)***
FoundChair -0.016 (-0.25) -0.343 (-2.09)**
FoundCEOChair -0.136 (-1.41) -0.459 (-1.91)*
Control variables
FoundOwn% 0.556 (6.03)*** 0.511 (5.47)*** 0.242 (1.05) 0.302 (1.29)
Size 0.032 (2.44)** 0.036 (2.70)*** -0.035 (-1.06) -0.043 (-1.28)
Age 0.000 (4.04)*** 0.000 (4.02)*** 0.000 (1.53) 0.000 (1.52)
Risk -0.175 (-3.65)*** -0.178 (-3.72)*** 0.180 (1.49) 0.197 (1.62)
IntA 0.238 (1.88)* 0.254 (2.00)** -1.170 (-3.67)*** -0.181 (-3.69)***
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
-adjusted 21.1% 21.7% 24.4% 24.2%
N 993 993 997 997
*      Denote significance at 10% level
**    Denote significance at 5% level
***  Denote significance at 1% level
T-statistic is denoted in brackets
†
The correlation between OpFound and FoundOwn% is 0.20
TABLE 8
Results from Ordinary Least Square Regressions of Return On Net Operating Assets and
 Tobin's Q on Founder Ownership and Operating Founder (t-statistics in parenthesis). 
Main Sample Consists of 2128 Firm-years from 2001 to 2010
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negative relationship with RNOA. However, only the coefficient for FoundBoard is statistically 
significant.  
Column four in Table 8 displays the results for the regression on TQ. All coefficients are 
negative, and here, only the FoundCEO coefficient is not significant.  
The decomposition of the operating founder variable enables us to illustrate how its 
components impact the performance of a firm. We find indications that every type of operating 
founder who is also an owner lowers the positive net effect on performance.
22
 Interestingly, we 
do not find that any type of involvement in the firm results in additional performance effects 
apart from the already observed ownership effect. 
Hypothesis 2 is not supported by our regression results, which gives the opposite 
relationship of what we expect. However, only the coefficient for OpFound in the main 
regression for TQ is significantly negative. For these reasons, we reject Hypothesis 2. 
Our test of Hypothesis 2 somewhat surprisingly contradicts most of the theory on founders 
in operating positions and performance. According to our results, founders who are owners and 
hold operating positions influence performance slightly negatively compared to founders who 
are simply owners. We interpret this result as a slightly increased entrenchment effect as a 
consequence of increased power. These findings are in line with the research of Morck et al. 
(1988) who propose that the founder‟s psychological attachment to the firm may lead to 
entrenchment, even with small stakes.  
However, we have to stress that the benefits of the incentive-alignment effect as a result of 
being a founder owner are considerably larger than both the negative performance related to the 
entrenchment of, owners, founder managers and board members.  
As a conclusion to this discussion, our findings from Hypothesis 2 contribute with insights 
that illustrate how some entrenchment can occur even when all incentives point in the direction 
of increased effort and non-shirking. The reason for this might be attributed to several factors 
e.g. the founder‟s tenure with the firm, status and personality. Additionally, we show that the 
founder‟s incentives to influence the firm positively are related to his level of ownership, and not 
his position in the management or the board. 
                                                 
22
 However, the RNOA-effect as a result of FoundCEO, FoundCEOBoard and FoundChair are somewhat dubious as 
they seem to be very close to zero. 
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Furthermore, our discussion here is somewhat flawed because it relies on an assumption of 
all founders having the same personalities. Variations in founder‟s influence on performance will 
obviously be observed due to risk-aversion, culture, personality or other unquantifiable 
differences. Anyhow, the above discussion will give some basic guidelines to how founders 
think and behave based on general economic theory of rational human behavior. 
4.5 TEST OF HYPOTHESIS 3 
Our third hypothesis is that firms owned by long-term oriented founders perform better than 
firms with other long-term oriented owners.  
Column one of Table 9 presents the regression for RNOA on founder and long-term 
ownership. The coefficient for founder ownership, ψ1, is 0.077 (t-stat: 2.96), while the coefficient 
for long-term ownership, ψ2, is -0.008, but not significant. In line with our hypothesis, ψ1 is 
significantly larger than ψ2. Furthermore, in column three of Table 9 the regression results for 
TQ is illustrated. Also here the coefficient for founder ownership (κ1 = 0.247) is significantly 
larger than the coefficient for long-term ownership (κ2 = -0.128). Both regressions therefore 
confirm Hypothesis 3: founder owned firms perform better than firms with a large long-term 
owner.  
Additionally, column two and four in Table 9 supports the findings above. In both these 
regressions we have excluded all firms not controlled by a founder or long-term owner. Thus, we 
only need one independent dummy variable to test Hypothesis 3. Since both μ1 and τ1 are 
positive and significant, we confirm that founder owned firms have a better performance than 
firms with a large long-term owner. Consequently, we accept Hypothesis 3. 
This finding shows that founder owned firms perform better than non-founder long-term 
owned firms. To the best of our knowledge, this is a novel empirical finding.  
The reasons for superior founder performance seems to be related to what Nelson (2003) 
claims to be the higher level of involvement a founder has in his firm. In addition, a long-term 
owner may not be able to accumulate knowledge about the firm in the same way as founder 
owners (He, 2008). The combination of higher accumulated knowledge and higher level of 
involvement seems to give the founder firm a superior advantage. Another effect that can 
contribute in explaining the founder‟s higher performance rate is “sweat equity”, as presented by 
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Arthurs & Busenitz (2003), which leads him to have a stronger psychological attachment to the 
firm than the non-founder.  
 
 
RNOA (11) t =  ψ 0 + ψ 1 FoundOwnDum t + ψ 2 LTO t + ψ 3 Size t  + ψ 4 Age t + ψ 5 Risk t  + ψ 6 IntA t  + υ t
RNOA (12) t =  μ0 + μ 1 FoundOwnDum t + μ 2 Size t  + μ 3 Age t + μ 4 Risk t  + μ 5 IntA t  + υ t
Tobin's Q (13) t =  κ 0 + κ 1 FoundOwnDum t + κ 2 LTO t + κ 3 Size t  + κ 4 Age t + κ 5 Risk t  + κ 6 IntA t  + υ t
Tobin's Q (14) t =  τ0 + τ 1 FoundOwnDum t + τ 2 Size t  + τ 3 Age t + τ 4 Risk t  + τ 5 IntA t  + υ t
RNOA (11) RNOA (12) Tobin's Q (13) Tobin's Q (14)
Constant -0.411 (-4.41)*** -0.428 (-3.37)*** 1.004 (4.49)*** 0.703 (2.17)**
Independent variables
FoundOwnDum 0.077 (2.96)*** 0.087 (2.31)** 0.247 (3.96)*** 0.357 (3.73)***
LTO -0.008 (0.805) -0.128 (-1.56)
Control variables
Size 0.048 (6.74)*** 0.044 (4.85)*** -0.044 (-2.59)*** -0.049 (-2.13)**
Age 0.000 (1.42) 0.000 (3.68)*** 0.001 (3.49)*** 0.000 (2.27)**
Risk -0.148 (-4.97)*** -0.183 (-4.73)*** 0.128 (1.77)* 0.198 (2.01)**
IntA 0.113 (1.70)* 0.132 (1.42) -0.547 (-3.44)*** -1.046 (-4.45)***
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2
-adjusted 15.6% 17.7% 24.6% 25.9%
N 2128 1377 2128 1377
T-test of
a
T-value P-value
ψ1 > ψ2: 1.995** 0.023
κ1 > κ2: 3.642*** 0.000
*      Denote significance at 10% level
**    Denote significance at 5% level
***  Denote significance at 1% level
T-statistic is denoted in brackets
a
The statistical test we use for equality of regression coefficients is based on the work of Paternoster et al. (1998) and Clogg et al. (1995)
TABLE 9
Results from Ordinary Least Square Regressions of 
Return On Net Operating Assets and Tobin's Q on Founder Ownership 
and Long Term Ownership (t-statistics in parenthesis)
Main Sample Consists of 2128 Firm-years from 2001 to 2010
31 
 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
In this research paper we have studied how founder owners influence firm performance. Our 
findings mainly show that founder owned firms have a positive influence on performance. 
Furthermore, when performing regressions on several ownership intervals, derived from the 
findings of Morck et al. (1988) and Florackis et al. (2009), we find evidence that indicate an 
exponential relationship between founder ownership and firm performance. Consequently, the 
incentive-alignment effect increases its supremacy over the entrenchment effect as the founder 
ownership percentage rise.  
When testing how operating founders who are owners influence performance, we 
unexpectedly find that they have a slightly lower positive net effect on firm performance. This 
uncovering is interpreted as a moderately increased entrenchment effect as a result of increased 
power. Thus, the operating founder exploits his position, in some degree, to harvest private 
benefits that maximize his private utility.  
Finally, we prove that founder owned firms perform better than firms who have long-term 
owners. Following Arthurs & Busenitz (2003), Nelson (2003) and He (2008), the superior 
performance of founder owners seems to be attributable to a combination a strong psychological 
attachment to the firm as well as higher accumulated knowledge and firm involvement. 
To the best of our knowledge, our research makes three contributions to the existing 
literature on how founder ownership influence firm performance. First, our research support 
earlier and established findings that founder ownership have a positive association with firm 
performance. However, we present results that extensively illustrate that the relationship between 
founder ownership percentage and firm performance is in fact not constant or linear, but 
exponential. We do this in a setting that has not been studied in the past. 
Second, we find reason to believe that some earlier findings that attribute firm performance 
to the founder‟s operating position could be a result of an omitted-variable bias. When we 
control for ownership percentage (an often omitted-variable), we find positive performance 
effects are mostly a result of founder ownership and not the founder‟s position as CEO or board 
member.  
Finally, we contribute with a novel finding that helps clarify that there is a difference in how 
long-term owners and founder owners are incentivized to influence firm performance.  
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We mainly argue that the incentive-alignment effect and the entrenchment effect is the main 
driver behind the positive performance effects of founder owners. However, other factors e.g. 
status orientation, risk-aversion, culture, personality and other unquantifiable differences can be 
explanatory factors that we are not able to consider in our analysis. 
In addition, there is a risk that our findings can be attributed to a self-selection bias. For 
instance, founders may reduce their equity stake if they believe their stock is overvalued or they 
foresee a substantial loss in value. If this is the case, our findings may be subject to a reverse 
causality interpretation.  
Future research should consider doing studies that include possible omitted-variables e.g. a 
founder‟s status orientation, risk-aversion or personality traits. It will also be interesting to test 
how the long-term owners perform relative to founder owners when controlling for voting power 
in each group. Researchers could also test whether their findings are consistent with ours, when 
changing the definition of a founder.   
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PAPER 2: HOW DO INVOLVED OWNERS INFLUENCE 
DIVIDEND PAYOUT POLICIES? 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Under the classical dividend irrelevance theorem of Miller and Modigliani (1961), 
stockholders agree to the firm‟s dividend policy because they view dividends and capital gains as 
perfect substitutes. However, due to taxes, transaction costs, asymmetric information and agency 
costs, Miller and Modigliani's general assumptions for perfect capital markets are violated (Berk 
& DeMarzo, 2011). The choice of dividend policy is therefore often explained by the magnitude 
of these violations. When a firm generates free cash flow they have the choice of retaining the 
cash or paying it out to the owners. When the firm retains cash, it can invest in new projects or 
increase the cash reserve. By distributing cash as a dividend or stock repurchase, the firm may 
reduce agency costs related to holding large cash reserves and signal information about future 
earnings prospects.  
To our knowledge, studies related to how agency costs affect large and powerful 
stockholders‟ preferences over dividends are sparse. By learning more about how different 
involved owners become entrenched and how this affects their dividend payout policy 
preferences, stakeholders will be more susceptible to understand the correct information about 
what owners‟ payout policies communicate.  
 Following Florackis et al. (2009), entrenched stakeholders could have incentives to harvest 
private benefits at the expense of the company and thereby increase agency costs. Furthermore, 
Farinha (2002) shows that managers who are more entrenched may adopt aggressive dividend 
policies. This finding is supported by Hu & Kumar (2004), who find that both the likelihood and 
level of payouts are positively related to factors that increase executive entrenchment levels. 
Both Villalonga & Amit (2006) and Wei et al. (2011) state that majority stockholders who are 
highly involved in the firm will act with some entrenchment. This might suggest, in line with 
Johnson et al. (2000) and Lee & Xiao (2004) that aggressive cash dividend policies may be a 
result of large and involved stockholders who become entrenched. 
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Following Wei et al. (2011) we employ a model consisting of both Logit and Tobit 
regressions to test how involved firm owners affect cash dividend payout policies. To determine 
the level of aggressiveness in a payout policy, we analyze both the tendency to pay cash 
dividends and the dividend payout ratio. Moreover, we define involved owners as large 
stockholders who are either founders or long-term owners. Among the founders, we distinguish 
between operating founders, e.g. CEOs and board members, and non-operating founders. In 
general, we define a founder as an individual who has created his own firm, in line with Begley 
& Boyd (1987).
23
 Finally, we define long-term owners as individuals who are not founders and 
have been the largest stockholders for more than five years continuously. Should a large 
stockholder be unhappy with the firm‟s dividend policy, he has the voting power to impose costs 
on other parties in attempt to change the policy (Eckbo & Verma, 1994). 
In our tests, we analyze how different levels of ownership involvement influence payout 
policy. Therefore, we define the largest firm owners who also are operating founders as having 
the highest level of firm involvement. They are very highly involved due to their managerial and 
board positions, as well as their psychological attachment as founders. Other founders, who are 
also the largest firm owners, are defined as having the second highest level of involvement. 
These owners are not managers or board members and are thus not as involved as the operating 
founders. However, other founders should still have some psychological attachment to the 
organization they founded. Finally, the largest firm owners who have been owners for more than 
five years are defined as long-term owners and have the third highest level of involvement. 
Mostly, these are only involved in the firm through their ownership tenure, and are thus not as 
involved as other founders. All other owners are perceived to have an equally low firm 
involvement. Owners who fall under one of the three highest levels of ownership involvement 
are referred to as involved owners. 
Our tests are based on an extensive data set that initially consists of 2671 firm-year 
observations, and includes 375 firms traded on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 
(Stockholmsbörsen), over the period 2001 - 2010.  
Our findings show that involved owners have more aggressive cash dividend policies. 
Furthermore, when examining different ownership involvement levels, we find that increased 
                                                 
23
 We assume that descendants of the founder carry on the same values and characteristics as the original founder, 
and thus regard descendants as founders per se. 
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ownership involvement leads to more aggressive dividend payout policies. Finally, our results 
unexpectedly indicate that founder owners who are solely CEO have less aggressive payout 
policies. To the best of our knowledge, these are all novel findings.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we derive two main hypotheses from theory 
on ownership involvement and dividends. Section 3 highlights our research methodology. The 
empirical analysis is presented in section 4, including descriptive statistics, comparative 
statistics, correlation analyses and regression analyses. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper. 
2.0 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The general understanding of dividend policy concludes that dividends tend to be sticky, 
tied to long-term sustainable earnings, paid by mature companies, and smoothed from year to 
year (Lintner, 1956 and Berk & DeMarzo, 2011). Moreover, managers agree that dividends 
communicate important information to investors (Brav et al., 2005). 
Florackis et al. (2009) explain that an entrenchment effect might exist when managers reach 
certain levels of ownership. Entrenched managers tend to use their position to harvest private 
benefits. On the other hand, there can also be an incentive-alignment effect that means an owner 
with influence will be more prone to constraining the consumption of perquisites (Florackis et al. 
2009). Most researchers agree that the positive incentive-alignment effect more than counteract 
the negative entrenchment effect for owner influenced and founder firms when it comes to firm 
performance.
24
 However, the academic research regarding how principal-agent theory and 
ownership incentive effects (e.g. entrenchment effects and incentive-alignment effects) affect 
payout policy decisions are not conclusive.   
Studies made by Morck et al. (1988) and Florackis et al. (2009), show that the incentive-
alignment effect and the entrenchment effect are dominant at different levels of ownership. 
These results provide support for both the incentive-alignment and the entrenchment hypotheses. 
Even though the incentive-alignment effect dominates the entrenchment effect at most levels of 
ownership, Florackis et al. (2009) show that for ownership levels above 60% the entrenchment 
effect is dominating. On the contrary, the assumption made by Morck et al. (1988) is that the 
                                                 
24
 C.f. Jensen & Meckling (1976), Demsetz & Lehn (1985), Morck et al. (1988), Alvarez & Busenitz (2001), 
Anderson & Reeb (2003) and Villalonga & Amit, (2006), Florackis et al. (2009). 
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entrenchment effect reaches its maximum at 25% ownership, and thus the incentive-alignment 
effect dominates above this level of managerial ownership. However, we should keep in mind 
that the more recent study made by Florackis et al. (2009) uses a semi-parametric estimate, 
which is likely to be superior to the method used by Morck et al. (1988). It is thus possible that 
the dominating entrenchment effect observed by Florackis et al. (2009), when having a large 
controlling owner, would also be observed by Morck et al. (1988) if a semi-parametric estimate 
had been used. The findings of Florackis are supported by Villalonga & Amit (2006) and Wei et 
al. (2011) who both state that a majority owner who actively manages his firm will act with some 
entrenchment. Johnson et al. (2000) shows that an expropriation by large stockholders at the 
expense of minority stockholders, so-called tunneling, are common, and as argued by Lee & 
Xiao (2004), cash dividends can be used as a tunneling activity.  
Following our discussion above regarding entrenchment effects and payout policy, majority 
owners with influence on cash dividend payout decisions should pay more dividends than 
general owners.
25
  
Following Farinha (2002), we find the entrenchment hypothesis from the agency literature 
interesting for analyzing payout policy, since it has consequences for dividend policy. When a 
critical level of entrenchment is reached, increases in ownership cause additional agency costs. 
Dividends may then be a compensating monitoring force that decrease costs related to the 
principal-agent problem. If so, a positive relationship between dividend payouts and insider 
ownership would be observed. In addition, Rozeff (1982) argue that dividend payouts can be 
used to reduce agency costs. The entrenchment hypothesis is supported by Hu & Kumar (2004) 
who find that both the likelihood and the level of payouts are significantly and positively 
(negatively) related to factors that increase (decrease) executive entrenchment levels.
26
 In 
addition, other things being equal, managers (agents) who can be disciplined by owners 
(principals) at relatively low costs choose higher payouts (Hu & Kumar, 2004). Since involved 
owners have a high tenure with the firm, are the largest owners, and have much influence, they 
will have few difficulties in disciplining managers. John & Knyazeva (2006) also find that high 
agency costs increase the likelihood of having cash distributions and decrease the reliance on 
discretionary payouts. As a consequence, the largest owner with influence (high involvement) in 
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 Discussion related to Farinha (2002), Hu & Kumar (2004) and John & Knyazeva (2006). 
26
 Even when controlling for size, leverage, and the proportion of tangible to total assets. 
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the firm should have a more aggressive cash dividend payout policy than other owners. For these 
reasons, we pose the following first hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1  
Firms with large and involved owners tend to have more aggressive cash dividend payout 
policies than other firms. 
 
When it comes to the topic of ownership involvement and dividend payouts, we should take 
into consideration that no clear empirical consensus exists among researchers. Monsen (1969) 
makes an early claim that owner operated firms have non-economic reasons (e.g. desire to rule a 
financial empire and/or the continuance of family name or tradition) to prefer to finance itself 
through high retained earnings rather than losing control of the firm by participating in outside 
capital markets. Eckbo & Verma (1994) finds indications that cash dividends decrease as the 
voting power of involved owners increase. On the other hand, Farinha (2002) argue that the same 
firms increase their use of dividends as a compensating monitoring force because of increased 
entrenchment.
27
 Despite the mixed views among researchers, both Farihna (2002) and Hu & 
Kumar (2004) argue that the owners‟ level of involvement heavily influences payout policy 
decisions. 
Operating founders often own a larger percentage of the firm than other managers (Nelson, 
2003). This creates an economic link between the founder and his firm, and it reduces the need 
for incentive compensation and outside monitoring. This implies that founder operated firms 
spend fewer resources on costly compensation schemes. In addition to this economic link, 
Nelson (2003) suggests that a psychological link exists between operating founders and the firm. 
This link reduces the agency costs related to managers‟ overconsumption of perquisites, as 
presented by Zimmerman (1979). However, we should keep in mind that operating founders 
could become entrenched, even at small stakes, because of their psychological attachment to the 
firm (Morck et al., 1988). These opposing views illustrate the lack of empirical consensus on the 
topic. Consequently, operating founders should be associated with lower dividends due to 
reduced agency costs. Following Morck et al. (1988), the psychological link between the founder 
and his firm increases the entrenchment, which again increases the agency costs related to 
                                                 
27 Entrenchment typically increases as the owners voting power increases.  
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managers‟ overconsumption of perquisites. Necessarily, the increased overconsumption of 
perquisites should result in an increase in the use of dividends as a compensating monitoring 
force (Farinha, 2002). 
Weisskopf (2010) conclude that founder owned firms are generally more likely to use 
dividends and pay higher dividends, than non-founder firms. Typically founders, and family 
members who are owners, may want to consume proceeds now and thus they pay more cash 
dividends. Finally, Weisskopf (2010) also emphasizes that non-owner founders do not have 
significantly different payout policies than other companies.  
The presence of a large stockholder may mitigate the use of dividends as a signal of good 
performance, as the large owners themselves can act as a more credible signal (Burkart et al., 
1997). However, according to Berk & DeMarzo (2011), when there is excessive cash available, 
managers who are not large owners tend to invest in unprofitable or “pet” projects, paying 
excessive executive compensations or over-paying for acquisitions. In such cases, Zeckhauser & 
Pound (1990) state that large long-term owners will enforce larger cash dividend payouts to 
reduce the cash surplus and avoid managerial agency costs in their firms because they hold 
blocks of voting power over long periods of time. 
Farinha (2002), Hu & Kumar (2004), John & Knyazeva (2006) and Morck et al. (1988) all 
argue that the entrenchment effect will be present in most owner-influenced firms. This will 
result in them having a more aggressive payout policy than other firms. Following the hierarchy 
of involvement, operating founders with large ownership positions should to be the most liberal 
when it comes to cash dividend payouts. Furthermore, firms with founder owners who are not in 
operating positions also seem to have somewhat more liberal cash dividend payout policies than 
general owners. Finally, large long-term owners can tend to be more liberal in their dividend 
payouts than general owners. For these reasons, we pose the following second hypothesis: 
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HYPOTHESIS 2 
Firms with more involved owners have more aggressive payout policies than firms with less 
involved owners.  
i. Large owners who are operating founders will have a more aggressive payout policy than other large 
owners who are solely founders.  
ii. Large owners who are solely founders will have a more aggressive payout policy than large long-term 
owners.  
iii. Large long-term owners will have a more aggressive payout policy than general owners. 
3.0 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
Table 1 contains summary descriptions of all the variables used in the empirical analysis.  
3.1.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Following Wei et al. (2011), our key dependent variables include a payout ratio and 
tendency to make dividend payouts. We use the dummy variable DumDIV to measure the 
probability of paying cash dividends. DumDIV equals 1 if the company pays cash dividends. We 
use cash dividend divided by average equity (CDIV) as our main measure of corporate payouts. 
3.1.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
All of our test variables are dummies related to involved owners. Following Begley & Boyd 
(1987), we unconditionally define a founder as an individual who has created his own firm. 
Consequently, the background (e.g. merger or spin-offs) for or purpose (e.g. tax savings) of the 
firm establishment does not affect our definition. Further, we assume that descendants of the 
founder carry on the same values and characteristics as the original founder, and thus regard 
descendants as founders per se. Our main variable is the involved owner (InvOwn) variable. 
InvOwn is employed to represent that an involved owner exists, and equals 1 when the largest 
stockholder is a long-term owner (including a founder). Next, we break down InvOwn into 
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OpFound, OtherFound and LTO. OpFound equals 1 when the founder is the largest stockholder 
and has a position as CEO or board member (or both). OtherFound is equal to 1 when the 
founder is the largest owner but not in an operating position. LTO equals 1 when the largest 
owner of the firm has been the main owner for more than five years. Finally, we break down 
OpFound into FoundCEO, FoundBoard, FoundCEOBoard, FoundChair and FoundCEOChair 
as illustrated in Table 1.  
 
 
3.1.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 
We employ industry effects (Industry), year effects (Year), firm size (Size), firm risk (Risk), 
public time (Time), listed owners (ListOwn), tendency to repurchase stocks (DumREP), 
investment opportunities (Investment), cash holdings (Cash), financial leverage (IBD) and 
Variables Symbol Definitions
Panel A: Depentent variables
Tendency to pay cash dividend DumDIV Equals 1 if the company pays cash dividends, and 0 otherwise
Cash dividend payout ratio CDIV Cash dividend divided by average equity
Panel B: Independent variables
Owner Involvement InvOwn Equals 1 if the founder is the largest owner or there is a long term owner (LTO), and zero if not
Operating Founder OpFound Equals 1 if the founder  is the largest owner and has a position as CEO, a position on the board or any 
combination of these, and zero if not
Other Founders OtherFound Equals 1 if the founder is the largest owner but not in an operating position, and zero if not
Long Term Owners LTO Equals 1 if the largest owner of the firm has been the largest owner for more than five years, and zero if not
Founder CEO FoundCEO Equals 1 if the founder is the largest owner and solely CEO, and zero if not
Founder Board FoundBoard Equals 1 if the founder is the largest owner and solely a member of the board, and zero if not
Founder CEO Board FoundCEOBoard Equals 1 if the founder is the largest owner and CEO and a member of the board, and zero if not
Founder Chairman FoundChair Equals 1 if the founder is the largest owner and solely chairman, and zero if not
Founder CEO Chairman FoundCEOChair Equals 1 if the founder is the largest owner and CEO and chairman, and zero if not
Panel C:  Control varables
Firm size Size Natural logarithm of average total assets
Public time Time The number of years the firm has been listed on the stock exhange
Firm risk Risk The standard deviation of the stock return based on four different points of return within an interval of one 
year and three months on either side of the accounting period's end
Cash holdings Cash Ratio of cash and cash equivalents to average total assets
Investment opportunities Investment Ratio of market value four months after the end of the accounting period to book value of assets
Financial leverage IBD Interest bearing debt divided by average total assets
Listed owner ListOwn Equals 1 if the founder-involved company is owned through a listed holding company 
Profitability RNOA Ratio of operating income to net operating assets
Tendency to repurchase stocks DumREP Equals 1 if the company repurchase stocks, and zero if not
Year effects Year Nine year dummy variables set for the ten-year sample period
Industry effects Industry Seventeen industry dummy variables set for eighteen industries (excluding the financial industry)
TABLE 1
Variable definitions
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profitability (RNOA) as control variables in our analysis. The Industry dummy variables and 
Year dummy variables, control for payout effects across different industries or years.
28
 
Furthermore, to control for firm-level characteristics, we apply three variables: Size, Time and 
Risk. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm‟s end-of-year market value. We define 
Risk as the standard deviation of the stock return based on four different points of return within 
an interval of one year and three months on either side of the accounting period‟s end. Time is 
the number of years the firm has been listed on the stock exchange. These three variables are 
meant to control for performance effects as a result of size, variability in stock return and 
survival time on the stock exchange.  
Given that we estimate how ownership involvement affects cash dividends, we introduce the 
dummy variable, ListOwn, to control for owner influenced firms that are owned through a listed 
holding company. Whether the involved owner owns his firm through a holding company for 
tax-reasons or other purposes, we assume that such owners have different payout preferences 
than directly involved owners. This also gives us the opportunity to map the real payout 
preferences of the involved owner.  Moreover, the control variable, DumREP, is meant to control 
for the association between discretionary payouts and cash payouts. 
There are also some other factors that directly influence payout policy, and we introduce 
three control variables to account for these effects. First, Investment is measured as the ratio of 
market value four months after the end of the accounting period to the book value of assets. 
Investment is included to control for high (low) investment opportunities, which might lead to 
high (low) retention rates. When a firm has high investment opportunities it should prefer to 
reinvest its money. Second, cash holdings and financial leverage in the firm should be controlled 
for, as these can influence payout policy to some degree. Cash is measured as the ratio of cash 
and cash equivalents to average total assets. Third, IBD (financial leverage) is measured as the  
interest bearing debt divided by average total assets. 
Finally, the accounting control-variable, RNOA, is included as a control variable to explain 
the portion of payouts that is merely associated with firm performance. To calculate RNOA, we 
use the balance sheet identity and distinguish between operating and financial assets/liabilities 
(c.f. Dechow et al., 2008):  
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 In accordance with Wei et al. (2011), we exclude the financial industry from our data, and thus, no dummy is 
needed for this industry. 
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Total assets equal the sum of total liabilities and equity (see eq. 1). We divide total assets 
into cash and operating assets, which then equal the sum of debt, operating liabilities and equity 
(see eq. 2). Net Operating Assets (NOA), which equals operating assets less operating liabilities, 
is then calculated as debt plus equity minus cash (see eq. 3). Finally, RNOA is calculated as 
operating profit divided by NOA (see eq. 4). 
 
Total assets = Total liabilities + Equity       (eq. 1) 
Cash + Operating assets = Debt + Operating liabilities + Equity    (eq. 2) 
NOA = Operating assets - Operating liabilities = Debt + Equity – Cash   (eq. 3) 
RNOA = Operating Profit / NOA        (eq. 4) 
3.2 RESEARCH MODELS 
The two dependent variables presented in Section 3.1.2 can be classified in two categories: 
the dummy variable, DumDIV, and the continuous variable, CDIV. To estimate the dependent 
dummy variable, we employ a logistic regression, which is fit for predicting the outcome of a 
binary dependent variable (Wei et al., 2011). The coefficient of each independent variable will 
represent that variable‟s association with the estimated tendency to pay cash dividends. 
 
Logit (DumDIV)t =  α0 + α1InvOwnt + α2Timet + α3Sizet + α4Riskt + α5Casht + α6Investmentt + 
α7IBDt  + α8ListOwnt + α9RNOAt  + α10DumREPt +  υt     (reg. 1) 
 
Logit (DumDIV)t =  β0 + β1OpFoundt + β2OtherFoundt + β3LTOt + β4Timet + β5Sizet + β6Riskt + 
β7Casht + β8Investmentt + β9IBDt  + β10ListOwnt + β11RNOAt  + β12DumREPt + υt  (reg. 2) 
 
Logit (DumDIV)t =  γ0 + γ1FoundCEOt + γ2FoundBoardt + γ3FoundCEOBoardt +  γ4FoundChairt + 
γ5FoundCEOChairt + γ6OtherFoundt + γ7LTOt +γ8Timet + γ9Sizet + γ10Riskt + γ11Casht + 
γ12Investmentt + γ13IBDt  + γ14ListOwnt + γ15RNOAt  + γ16DumREPt + υt   (reg. 3) 
 
Since all payouts are either zero or positive, OLS is not an appropriate method to analyze the 
payment of dividends (Al-Malkawi, 2007). Consequently, to measure a non-negative continuous 
dependent variable, we follow Han et al. (1999), Al-Malkawi (2007), Kouki (2009) and Wei et 
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al. (2011), who use Tobit estimation to measure CDIV. In such a setting, the coefficient of each 
independent variable represents that variable‟s association with the estimated cash dividend 
payout ratio. 
 
Tobit (CDIV)t =  ε0 + ε1InvOwnt + ε2Timet + ε3Sizet + ε4Riskt + ε5Casht + ε6Investmentt + ε7IBDt  + 
ε8ListOwnt + ε9RNOAt  + ε10DumREPt + υt       (reg. 4) 
 
Tobit (CDIV)t =  η0 + η1OpFoundt + η2OtherFoundt + η3LTOt + η4Timet + η5Sizet + η6Riskt + 
η7Casht + η8Investmentt + η9IBDt  + η10ListOwnt + η11RNOAt  + η12DumREPt + υt  (reg. 5) 
 
Tobit (CDIV)t =  θ0 + θ1FoundCEOt + θ2FoundBoardt + θ3FoundCEOBoardt +  θ4FoundChairt + 
θ5FoundCEOChairt + θ6OtherFoundt + θ7LTOt +θ8Timet + θ9Sizet + θ10Riskt + θ11Casht + 
θ12Investmentt + θ13IBDt  + θ14ListOwnt + θ15RNOAt  + θ16DumREPt + υt   (reg. 6) 
 
Regression models (reg. 1) and (reg. 4) are used to examine Hypothesis 1 on the impact of 
involved owners on the cash dividend policy of listed companies. In regression models (reg. 2) 
and (reg. 5), the InvOwn variable is decomposed into OpFound, OtherFound and LTO, which 
represent a hierarchy of involved owners, and helps test Hypothesis 2 to examine whether the 
impact of operating founders on cash dividends is stronger than the impact of other founders and 
long-term owners on cash dividends. Finally, Models (reg. 3) and (reg. 6) examines how large 
founder owners in operating positions, e.g. CEO, board member, chairman, or any combination 
of these, impact cash dividend policy. 
3.3 SAMPLE FORMATION 
The empirical tests are conducted using financial statements data and stock prices data from 
publicly listed companies in Sweden from 2001 to 2010, gathered by Ph.D. Mattias Hamberg, 
who is an associate professor at the Norwegian School of Economics. The data set originally 
consists of 375 firms and 2671 firm-year observations.  
46 
 
3.3.1 DATA CLEANING 
In accordance with Anderson & Reeb (2003), we exclude banks due to the difficulty in 
calculating investment opportunities (Investment) for banks.
29
 We also exclude firms not 
domiciled in Sweden and those not reporting in Swedish kronor. In the process of cleaning the 
data set a total of 490 firm-year observations were excluded because of missing data, which 
leaves us with 2,181 firm-years before trimming. 
We decided to include a small amount of observations where the accounting period is longer 
than one year. We also decided to include firms in the first year they are listed although this 
means that stock returns have to be estimated on the basis of a shorter period than 12 months. 
None of these choices are likely to alter the bulk of our results. 
3.3.2 BIAS CONSIDERATION 
We have considered both hindsight bias and survival bias during our data selection process. 
Hindsight bias means that the information used should be available to the investors at the time an 
observation was made. Avoiding this bias has been an especially important consideration in our 
study. We have thus used market values four months after the end of the accounting period and 
returns estimated from three months after the accounting period ends, and continuing either 365 
days or until the company's last day of trading.  Survival bias arises when a researcher purposely 
selects a population that has survived throughout the studied time period and excludes the non-
survivors. The appropriate procedure is to observe firms at one point in the past, and then follow 
them throughout the time period of concern. If they fall out of the sample during the sample 
period then we just exclude them on an “on the go” basis. 
Furthermore, studies which relate themselves to founder ownership, control, and 
management can be prone to self-selection biases (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Because all three 
elements are likely an outcome of endogenous decisions, the observed relation between each of 
them and firm value may be subject to alternative interpretations to value creation or destruction 
according to Villalonga & Amit (2006). Such effects can in turn influence payout policy. 
Following Villalonga & Amit (2009), if this is the case, relationships we find between founder 
ownership and dividend payout policies could be linked to a reverse causality interpretation.  
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 We remove all observations with industry code 42 (Banks) from our initial data set. 
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3.3.3 DATA TRIMMING 
The data set has been trimmed to control for extreme observations (outliers). Not controlling 
for outliers can make the sample unrepresentative, increase the standard deviation and reduce the 
power of our statistical tests. An outlier is an observation that appears to be inconsistent with the 
rest of the data set and can be identified by a graphical interpretation of the data. Also, cash 
dividend payout ratios are very skewed by nature. For this reason we use a Tobit regression to 
estimate CDIV.  
We have chosen to trim 1% on CDIV in the high end in order to eliminate the influence of 
extreme outliers and to better satisfy the assumptions for the Tobit regressions.
30
 A total number 
of 22 observations are removed. After trimming we were left with 2,159 firm-year observations.  
4.0 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
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 There is no reason to trim on the binary dependent variable, DumDIV, since we do a Logistic regression to 
estimate the tendency to pay cash dividends. 
Mean Median Min Max SD
Panel A: Dependent Variables
DumDIV 0.588 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.492
CDIV 0.049 0.027 0.000 0.412 0.069
Panel B: Independent Variables
InvOwn 0.510 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.500
OpFound 0.285 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.451
OtherFound 0.048 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.214
LTO 0.177 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.382
FoundCEO 0.007 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.083
FoundBoard 0.100 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.300
FoundCEOBoard 0.079 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.270
FoundChair 0.078 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.269
FoundCEOChair 0.021 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.143
All descriptive statistics in panel B and C are based based on the CDIV sample. 
TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics
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Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis. The mean of 
DumDIV is 58.8%, indicating that over half of the listed companies in Sweden pay cash 
dividends. CDIV is 4.9% on average, indicating that five percent of equity is used to pay cash 
dividends.
31
 Generally, the descriptive data illustrate that the cash dividend payout ratio and 
tendency to pay dividends are fairly low.  
Table 3 gives a general overview of how many operating founders, other founders and long-
term owners that are observed in our data set. It shows that as many as 1,101 of the 2,159 firm-
year observations (51.0%) have an owner with some level of involvement in the firm. In line 
with the expectations from Hypothesis 1, both the tendency to pay dividends and the payout ratio 
for InvOwn seems to be larger than for the whole sample. Further, OpFound counts for 28.5% of 
the observations, OtherFound 4.8% and LTO 17.7%. However, the magnitudes in the tendency 
to pay dividends and payout ratio seem somewhat different from what we expect in Hypothesis 
2. OpFound appear to have both a little lower tendency to pay dividends and payout ratio than 
OtherFound and LTO.  
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 The same relationships that are shown in row ten of Table 3. 
Mean Median Min Max SD
Panel C: Control Variables
Size 7.351 7.055 2.110 12.741 1.951
Time 13.673 8.000 0.000 108.000 17.490
Risk 0.406 0.278 0.003 3.872 0.409
Cash 0.158 0.088 0.000 2.488 0.195
Investment 1.454 0.875 0.000 35.132 2.220
IBD 0.212 0.170 0.000 1.469 0.201
ListOwn 0.090 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.286
RNOA 0.029 0.083 -75.754 77.741 3.161
DumREP 0.125 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.330
All descriptive statistics in panel B and C are based based on the CDIV sample. 
TABLE 2 (continuing)
Descriptive statistics
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4.2 COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The comparative descriptive data for owner-involved firms and other firms is presented in 
Table 4. The first column shows the descriptive means for owner involved firms while column 
two shows the descriptive means for other firms. In the third column, we present the p-value 
from two-tailed t-tests to reject the null hypothesis of equal mean across these two groups. 
In Panel A of Table 4 we report the means of the tendency to pay cash dividends (DumDiv) 
and the payout ratio (CDIV). The univariate analysis shows that both DumDiv and CDIV seem to 
be different for owner-involved firms than other firms. Thus, we find clear tendencies indicating 
that the owner-involved firms have different payout policies than other firms.  
Panel B of Table 4 compares the mean of the firm characteristics for owner-involved firms 
and other firms. As expected, Size, Time and Risk are different. The means of Size and Time 
seems to be larger for owner-involved firms than other firms, while owner-involved Risk is 
smaller than other firms. These observations make sense since we only include firms where the 
involved owner also is the largest owner.
32
 Since the three main firm characteristic variables are 
significantly different, they are very suitable as control variables in our regressions later on. 
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 We do this to be able to easily compare our results across different classifications of involvement.  
n % Mean DumDIV Mean CDIV
InvOwn 1,101 51.0 % 0.711 0.057
OpFound 615 28.5 % 0.661 0.051
FoundCEO 15 0.7 % 0.533 0.016
FoundBoard 215 10.0 % 0.706 0.055
FoundCEOBoard 171 7.9 % 0.591 0.043
FoundChair 169 7.8 % 0.690 0.062
FoundCEOChair 45 2.1 % 0.644 0.036
OtherFound 104 4.8 % 0.792 0.064
LTO 382 17.7 % 0.769 0.065
Full sample 2,159 100% 0.584 0.049
TABLE 3
Number of observations and average DumDiv and CDIV
for the independent variables.
Full sample is the sample size for the regression based on CDIV. The sample size for the regression based on DumDiv is 2181. 
The Mean DumDiv and Mean CDIV values are gathered from the DumDiv and CDIV sample respectively. The number of 
observations values are based on the CDIV sample.  The sub-categories for OpFound are all unique observations. 
Accordingly, their sum is equal to the OpFound variable. Since we only include involved owners who are also the largest 
owners in this study, the number of observations related to FoundCEO and FoundCEOChair is fairly small. This could be a 
factor that prevents statistical significance for these variables. 
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Panel B also shows two more variables that are significantly different between owner-
involved and other firms, namely Cash and ListOwn. First, the cash holdings in owner-involved 
firms seem to be a little smaller than for other firms. Since we do not find a significant difference 
in profitability (RNOA) between the two groups, an explanation for our observation of lower 
cash holdings can be that owner-involved firms use a larger amount of their cash to pay 
dividends. Second, ListOwn is most likely different because the variable only includes founders.  
4.3 CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables used in the 
analysis for the pooled sample of both owner involved and other firms. It shows that involved 
owners are associated with both higher DumDIV (t-stat: 12.38) and CDIV (t-stat: 5.94). OpFound 
is also positively associated with both DumDIV (t-stat: 4.45) and CDIV (t-stat: 1.17), yet only the 
DumDIV correlation is significant. Next, both OtherFound and LTO are associated with both 
Owner-involved firms Other firms T-test 
Mean Mean P-value
Panel A: Payout Variables
DumDIV 0.711 0.461 0.000
CDIV 0.057 0.040 0.000
Panel B: Control Variables
Size 7.749 6.938 0.000
Time 18.305 8.853 0.000
Risk 0.370 0.443 0.000
Cash 0.149 0.168 0.025
Investment 1.418 1.493 0.432
IBD 0.205 0.219 0.118
ListOwn 0.176 0.000 0.000
RNOA -0.018 0.079 0.479
DumREP 0.124 0.126 0.878
The control variable means in panel B are based on the CDIV sample.
TABLE 4
Comparative descriptive data for Owner-involved firms
and Other firms
51 
 
higher DumDIV (t-stats: 4.35 and 8.12 respectively) and CDIV (t-stats: 2.35 and 5.04 
respectively). All this speaks in favor of Hypothesis 1.  
When it comes to the magnitude of association with DumDIV and CDIV, LTO is largest. 
This somewhat contradicts our prediction from Hypothesis 2. However, seen in relation with the 
descriptive data for OpFound, OtherFound and LTO in Panel B of Table 3, this proves the need 
for a regression to estimate the real effects on cash dividend policy.
33
 
All the combinations of founders who also have a position on the board have an association 
with higher tendencies to pay cash dividends. FoundCEO show a negative association for 
DumDIV (t-stat: -0.40) and CDIV (t-stat: -1.86), yet the association for DumDIV is not 
significant. Founder board members and chairmen have a positive association with the payout 
ratio, CDIV (t-stats: 3.72 and 2.82 respectively). Founder board members and chairmen who are 
also CEOs tend to have a somewhat negative relationship with CDIV (t-stats: -1.17 and -1.23 
respectively). 
The correlation between Size and Time (t-stat: 29.49), Time and ListOwn (t-stat: 21.78), and 
IBD and Cash (t-stat: -21.06) could indicate multicollinearity between these variables.
34
 Time, 
Size, ListOwn, RNOA and DumREP are associated with both a higher DumDIV (t-stats: 13.93, 
26.49, 9.46, 2.32 and 11.71 respectively) and CDIV (t-stats: 5.87, 13.94, 4.67, 2.79 and 8.41 
respectively). Risk and Cash are associated with lower DumDIV (t-stats: -9.93 and -11.43 
respectively) and CDIV (t-stats: -5.81 and -3.85 respectively). Finally, Investment and IBD is 
associated with respectively lower and higher DumDIV (t-stats: -7.24 and 8.23 respectively). 
Among all the control variables, Size is the only variable that shows a correlation with DumDIV 
above 0.40. However, it makes sense that the larger the firm, the more likely it is to pay cash 
dividends. 
                                                 
33
 Also see Section 3.1.1. 
34
 We suspect multicollinearity between variables when the correlation coefficient is larger than 0.40. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 DumDIV 1
2 CDIV 0.595*** 1
3 InvOwn 0.257*** 0.127*** 1
4 OpFound 0.095*** 0.025 0.619*** 1
5 OtherFound 0.093*** 0.050** 0.221*** -0.142*** 1
6 LTO 0.172*** 0.108*** 0.455*** -0.293*** -0.104*** 1
7 FoundCEO -0.009 -0.040* 0.082*** 0.133*** -0.019 -0.039* 1
8 FoundBoard 0.080*** 0.032 0.326*** 0.527*** -0.075*** -0.154*** -0.028 1
9 FoundCEOBoard 0.004 -0.025 0.288*** 0.465*** -0.066*** -0.136*** -0.025 -0.098*** 1
10 FoundChair 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.286*** 0.462*** -0.066*** -0.135*** -0.024 -0.097*** -0.085*** 1
11 FoundCEOChair 0.018 -0.027 0.143*** 0.231*** -0.033 -0.068*** -0.012 -0.049** -0.043** -0.043** 1
12 Time 0.287*** 0.125*** 0.270*** -0.007 0.106*** 0.303*** 0.003 0.036* -0.053** 0.015 -0.026 1
13 Size 0.495*** 0.287*** 0.208*** -0.089*** 0.088*** 0.328*** 0.032 -0.007 -0.140*** 0.004 -0.028 0.536*** 1
14 Risk -0.209*** -0.124*** -0.089*** -0.026 -0.028 -0.069*** 0.001 -0.027 0.022 -0.042* 0.010 -0.083*** -0.133*** 1
15 Cash -0.239*** -0.083*** -0.048** 0.085*** -0.001 -0.163*** -0.042* 0.004 0.145*** -0.006 0.022 -0.134*** -0.377*** 0.087*** 1
16 Investment -0.154*** 0.007 -0.017 0.053** 0.011 -0.092*** -0.023 0.004 0.085*** 0.019 -0.022 -0.097*** -0.284*** 0.106*** 0.362*** 1
17 IBD 0.174*** 0.004 -0.034 -0.065*** -0.057*** 0.064*** 0.062*** -0.021 -0.048** -0.037* -0.035 0.042** 0.357*** -0.062*** -0.413*** -0.260*** 1
18 ListOwn 0.199*** 0.100*** 0.308*** -0.044** -0.033 0.474*** -0.026 0.047** -0.086*** -0.055** 0.045** 0.424*** 0.395*** -0.037* -0.096*** -0.081*** -0.024 1
19 RNOA 0.050** 0.060*** -0.015 -0.024 0.012 0.002 0.003 0.005 -0.022 -0.026 0.000 0.019 0.052** 0.002 0.011 0.021 -0.012 0.013 1
20 DumREP 0.244*** 0.178*** -0.003 0.004 -0.039* 0.013 0.104*** -0.022 -0.043** 0.041* 0.004 0.124*** 0.230*** -0.067*** -0.104*** -0.107*** 0.081*** 0.038* 0.019 1
*      Denote significant at 10% level
**    Denote significant at 5% level
***  Denote significant at 1% level
TABLE 5
Correlation Matrix
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4.4 CONTROL VARIABLE ANALYSIS 
The coefficients for the control variable analysis are found in Table 6. Each respective 
control variable coefficient points in the same direction for all the six regressions, except for 
Time and ListOwn. The explanation for them having different directions in the Logit and Tobit 
regressions is probably related to their high correlation with each other.
35
  
It seems likely that the effect of a firm‟s tenure as a listed company (Time) increases its 
propensity to pay cash dividends.  However, the estimations also show that as Time grows, the 
effect on the payout ratio is actually slightly negative. It is also reasonable that a larger firm (the 
Size variable) affect both the tendency to pay cash dividends and the payout ratio positively. Risk 
is naturally associated with both a lower payout ratio and tendency to pay dividends. 
When a firm holds more Cash its possibilities to pay dividends increase, and such a positive 
relationship is observed in all regressions. When a firm has greater Investment opportunities, it is 
more profitable to retain cash inside the company to exploit growth opportunities. However, in 
our analysis we observe that high Investment actually has a positive influence on both the payout 
ratio and the tendency to pay cash dividends. Furthermore, firms with high interest bearing debt 
(IBD) should naturally pay less cash dividends. Our estimations confirm this relationship. 
Being a listed owner (ListOwn) seems to influence the tendency to pay cash dividends 
positively and the payout ratio negatively. However, none of these coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. Logically, both good performance (RNOA) and stock repurchase (DumREP) 
activity seems to have a positive influence on both the payout ratio and propensity to pay 
dividend.  
4.5 TEST OF HYPOTHESIS 1 
Our first hypothesis is that firms owned by involved owners have more aggressive cash 
dividend policies than other firms. 
Table 6 summarizes the tests for Hypothesis 1 in column one and four. Column one shows 
the estimations of a Logit regression of DumDIV on involved owners (InvOwn). The coefficient 
for InvOwn, α1, is 0.934 (t-stat: 7.70), which indicates that involved ownership is associated with 
                                                 
35
 The correlation coefficient between Time and ListOwn is 0.424 
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a higher propensity to pay cash dividends. Column four in Table 6 shows the estimations of a 
Tobit regression of CDIV on InvOwn. Also here, the coefficient for InvOwn (ε1 = 0.026, t-stat: 
5.68) is positive. This indicates that firms with involved owners are linked to a higher dividend 
payout ratio than other firms. 
 
DumDIV (1) t =  α 0 + α 1 InvOwn t + α 2 Time t  + α 3 Size t  + α 4 Risk t  + α 5 Cash t  + α 6 Investment t  + α 7 IBD t   + α 8 ListOwn t  + α 9 RNOA t   + α 10 DumREP t  +  υ t
DumDIV (2) t =  β 0 + β 1 OpFound t + β 2 OtherFound t  + β 3 LTO t  + β 4 Time t  + β 5 Size t  + β 6 Risk t  + β 7 Cash t  + β 8 Investment t  + β 9 IBD t   + β 10 ListOwn t  + β 11 RNOA t   + β 12 DumREP t  + υt
CDIV (4) t =  ε 0 + ε 1 InvOwn t + ε 2 Time t  + ε 3 Size t  + ε 4 Risk t  + ε 5 Cash t  + ε 6 Investment t  + ε 7 IBD t   + ε 8 ListOwn t  + ε 9 RNOA t   + ε 10 DumREP t  + υ t
CDIV (5) t =  η 0 + η 1 OpFound t + η 2 OtherFound t  + η 3 LTO t  + η 4 Time t  + η 5 Size t  + η 6 Risk t  + η 7 Cash t  + η 8 Investment t  + η 9 IBD t   + η 10 ListOwn t  + η 11 RNOA t   + η 12 DumREP t  + υt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -3.123 (-6.06)*** -3.269 (-6.28)*** -3.320 (-6.34)*** -0.114 (-6.38)*** -0.116 (-6.39)*** -0.114 (-6.24)***
Independent variables
InvOwn 0.934 (7.70)*** 0.026 (5.68)***
OpFound 1.127 (8.08)*** 0.027 (5.31)***
FoundCEO -0.993 (-1.25) -0.061 (-2.30)**
FoundBoard 1.092 (5.29)*** 0.031 (4.24)***
FoundCEOBoard 1.481 (6.55)*** 0.036 (4.40)***
FoundChair 1.146 (5-05)*** 0.028 (3.44)***
FoundCEOChair 0.671 (1.71)* 0.006 (0.39)
OtherFound 1.066 (3.42)*** 1.084 (3.46)*** 0.026 (2.63)*** 0.026 (2.71)***
LTO 0.419 (2.20)** 0.411 (2.15)** 0.023 (3.36)*** 0.023 (3.36)***
Control variables
Time 0.011 (1.50) 0.012 (1.67)* 0.011 (1.56) -0.000 (-2.81)*** -0.000 (-2.81)*** -0.000 (-2.92)***
Size 0.621 (12.10)*** 0.650 (12.36)*** 0.664 (12.46)*** 0.021 (12.70)*** 0.021 (12.59)*** 0.021 (12.63)***
Risk -1.213 (-6.42)*** -1.235 (-6.49)*** -1.225 (-6.39)*** -0.055 (-7.60)*** -0.055 (-7.61)*** -0.054 (-7.49)***
Cash 0.648 (1.70)* 0.550 (1.41) 0.502 (1.27) 0.010 (0.68) 0.009 (0.62) 0.008 (0.50)
Investment 0.093 (3.29)*** 0.091 (3.20)*** 0.091 (3.18)*** 0.008 (6.49)*** 0.008 (6.46)*** 0.008 (6.43)***
IBD -0.997 (-2.57)*** -0.990 (-2.51)** -1.018 (-2.57)*** -0.055 (-3.82)*** -0.055 (-3.82)*** -0.055 (-3.78)***
ListOwn 0.247 (0.79) 0.439 (1.41) 0.465 (1.48) -0.011 (-1.41) -0.010 (-1.13) -0.009 (-1.02)
RNOA 0.012 (0.70) 0.012 (0.68) 0.013 (0.75) 0.001 (1.75)* 0.001 (1.74)* 0.001 (1.79)*
DumREP 1.383 (5.61)*** 1.388 (5.60)*** 1.449 (5.79)*** 0.027 (4.47)*** 0.270 (4.43)*** 0.029 (4.83)***
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
χ2 1046.84 1058.58 1070.78 894.07 894.49 910.44
Pseudo R
2
0.3542 0.3582 0.3623 -1.1563 -1.1568 -1.1774
N 2181 2181 2181 2159 2159 2159
T-test of
a
T-value P-value
β1 > β2: 0.179 0.429
β2 > β3: 1.77** 0.038
β1 > β3: 3.000*** 0.001
η1 > η2: 0.138 0.445
η2 > η3: 0.254 0.400
η1 > η3: 0.535 0.296
*      Denote significance at 10% level
**    Denote significance at 5% level
***  Denote significance at 1% level
a
The statistical test we use for equality of regression coefficients is based on the work of Paternoster et al. (1998) and Clogg et al. (1995). T-statistic is denoted in brackets.
TABLE 6
Results from Logit Regressions (1-3) and Tobit Regressions (4-6) of DumDiv and CDIV on Founder Influence (t-statistics in parenthesis)
Full Sample Consists of 2487 Firm-years from 2001 to 2010
Logit (DumDIV) Tobit (CDIV)
DumDIV (3) t =  γ 0 + γ 1 FoundCEO t + γ2 FoundBoard t  + γ 3 FoundCEOBoard t  +  γ 4 FoundChair t  + γ 5 FoundCEOChair t  + γ 6 OtherFound t  + γ 7 LTO t  +γ 8 Time t  + γ 9 Size t  + γ 10 Risk t + ---
------------------  γ 11 Cash t  + γ 12 Investment t  + γ 13 IBD t   + γ 14 ListOwn t  + γ 15 RNOA t   + γ 16 DumREP t  + υt
CDIV (6) t =  θ 0 + θ 1 FoundCEO t + θ2 FoundBoard t  + θ 3 FoundCEOBoard t  +  θ 4 FoundChair t  + θ 5 FoundCEOChair t  + θ 6 OtherFound t  + θ 7 LTO t  +θ 8 Time t  + θ 9 Size t  + θ 10 Risk t  + ----
---------------  θ 11 Cash t  + θ 12 Investment t  + θ 13 IBD t   + θ 14 ListOwn t  + θ 15 RNOA t   + θ 16 DumREP t  + υt
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As a conclusion, both regressions in column one and four in Table 6 support Hypothesis 1. 
In line with the hypothesis, large owners with high involvement in their firms will typically 
support more aggressive cash dividend payout policies. The reason for supporting higher 
dividend payments is most likely related to some sort of large-owner entrenchment effect. 
Our study contributes to the general corporate finance research by proving that large firm 
owners who are also involved in their companies have aggressive dividend payout preferences.  
When an owner becomes more involved in his firm, entrenchment increases. As a result, he 
might start shirking or harvesting private benefits at the expense of the company and other 
stakeholders. The owner‟s reasons for getting involved in such activities are driven by his 
personal objectives of maximizing his private utility. However, his optimization of private utility 
is usually a mix of actions related to both an incentive-alignment effect and an entrenchment 
effect (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  
We suggest that there are three reasons to why involved owners have more aggressive cash 
dividend payout policies than others. First, in line with Johnson et al. (2000) and Lee & Xiao 
(2004), large owners with a strong attachment to the firm, e.g. long-term owners or founders, 
might use dividends (as a tunneling activity) to reach personal objectives. Second, as argued by 
Farinha (2002), because of the involved owner‟s entrenchment, dividends can be used a 
compensating monitoring force. The final reason for observing high levels of cash dividends in 
owner involved firms is the fact that they usually are influential, and has high voting power and 
tenure. In accordance with Hu & Kumar (2004) this power gives them few difficulties in 
disciplining other entrenched managers at low costs, leading managers to choose higher cash 
dividends. None of these explanations are mutually exclusive since they could occur 
simultaneously depending on the situation, the involved owner‟s status and personal objectives.36 
 4.6 TEST OF HYPOTHESIS 2 
Our second hypothesis is that the aggressiveness of the cash dividend payout policy 
increases with the owner‟s level of involvedness. As mentioned earlier, we define OpFound as 
the highest level of involvement, OtherFound as the second highest, and LTO as the third.  
                                                 
36
 Since we include descendants in our definition of founder, some of the result might be attributable the 
descendants‟ wish of consuming proceeds now and thus they pay more cash dividends (Weisskopf, 2010). 
56 
 
Table 6 summarizes the tests for Hypothesis 2 in column two and five. Column two shows 
the estimations of a Logit regression (reg. 2) of DumDIV on OpFound, OtherFound and LTO. 
The coefficients for each of these three independent variables are positive. The coefficient for 
OpFound, β1, is 1.127 (t-stat: 8.08). OpFound’s coefficient is larger than the coefficient for 
OtherFound, β2, which is 1.066 (t-stat: 3.42). Finally, the coefficient for LTO, β3, is 0.419 (t-stat: 
2.20), which is the smallest of the three independent variables. Furthermore, we show the same 
coefficient pattern in column five where we estimate CDIV through a Tobit regression (reg. 5) on 
OpFound, OtherFound and LTO. 
In the Logit regression (reg. 2), β1 and β2 are significantly larger than β3, while a t-test 
cannot confirm that β1 is significantly larger than β2. However, in Tobit regression (reg. 5) t-tests 
cannot confirm that any of the coefficients η1, η2, or η3 are significantly larger than the other. 
Nevertheless, the estimations of both the cash dividend payout ratio and tendency to pay 
dividends appear to be largest for operating founders, second largest for other founders and third 
largest for long-term owners.  
Our findings in column two and four in Table 6 provide support for Hypothesis 2. First, 
when the largest firm owner is involved as an operating founder, his firm typically has a very 
aggressive cash dividend policy. Second, if the largest firm owner is a founder, but do not hold 
an operating position, his firm‟s cash dividend payout is still aggressive. Finally, long-term 
owners who are the largest firm owners also have slightly aggressive payout policies, but less 
than the founder owners. Even though all the estimated coefficient patterns are observed in 
respect to what we predict in Hypothesis 2, we are unable to statistically prove all of them. For 
these reasons, we accept Hypothesis 2, with some doubts. Furthermore, since there are few 
conclusive studies on how founder owners in specific operating positions treat cash dividend 
payouts, we do some additional tests to assess how they influence payout policy.  
Column three and six of Table 6 display the regressions for specific operating positions. The 
estimations of a Logit regression (reg. 3) of DumDIV on the different operating positions, 
OtherFound, and LTO is shown in column three. The coefficient for FoundCEO (γ2 = -0.993, t-
stat: -1.25) is negative, but not significant. All the other coefficients are positive, with the 
coefficient for FoundCEOBoard, γ3, being the largest at 1.481 (t-stat: 6.55). This indicates that 
founders with a board position have a higher propensity to pay cash dividends. The coefficient 
for FoundCEOChair, γ5, is the lowest among those with board positions at 0.671 (t-stat: 1.71), 
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indicating a lower tendency to pay dividends. Finally, the coefficients for FoundBoard, 
FoundCEOBoard, and FoundChair are all larger than the coefficients for both OtherFound (γ6 = 
1.084, t-stat: 3.46) and LTO (γ7 = 0.411, t-stat: 2.15). Accordingly, these instances of operating 
founders have a higher propensity to pay cash dividends than other founders and long-term 
owners.           
Column six in Table 6 shows the estimations of a Tobit regression of CDIV on the operating 
positions. Here, the same coefficient pattern as for the Logit regression is observed. The 
coefficient for FoundCEO, θ1, is -0.061 (t-stat: 2.30), and indicates a negative association with 
dividend payout ratio (CDIV). Additionally, FoundBoard, FoundCEOBoard and FoundChair all 
have higher cash dividend payout ratios than other founders and long-term owners.
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As a conclusion, we find that founders who have positions on the board and are the largest 
firm owners all have aggressive cash dividend payout policies. However, founder-CEOs that act 
as Chairman of the board have slightly less aggressive payout policies. Interestingly, owners who 
are solely founder-CEOs actually have more restrictive payout policies than other owners.  
Since the empirical research on the effect of different levels of ownership involvement on 
payout policy is quite inconsistent, it is especially appealing that our findings contribute to the 
research on this topic. For instance, Monsen (1969) states that increased ownership involvement 
should reduce the cash dividends, while Farinha (2002) claims the opposite effect. Our findings 
are in line with Farinha‟s (2002) view that increased ownership involvement leads to more 
aggressive dividend payout policies. Higher dividends are related to an increasing entrenchment 
effect as a result of increased ownership involvement.  
The owners who are operating founders have the highest level of involvement due to their 
decision making positions and psychological attachment to the firm, which gives them great 
power to influence dividends. Their psychological attachment in combination with large 
ownership positions increases their level of entrenchment. Through decision making positions 
they are able to exploit their entrenchment by using dividends for tunneling purposes and/or as a 
compensating monitoring force. Accordingly, operating founders are associated with the most 
aggressive cash dividend payout policies.   
Owners who are not in managerial or board positions have the second highest level of 
involvement. While they have a psychological attachment that makes them entrenched; they lack 
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 All the coefficients of the independent variables in column six of Table 6, except θ5, are statistically significant.  
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the positional power to exploit their entrenchment wishes fully. Alternatively, the consequences 
of these actions are mitigated by other factors in our regression analyses. 
Long-term owners have the third highest level of involvement. Since they did not found the 
firm themselves, their attachment to the firm is mostly related to their tenure as owner. Due to 
the lower level of attachment, we also observe a slightly lower entrenchment effect for these 
owners. The long-term owner is probably also involved in tunneling and/or monitoring through 
dividends. However, on the account of lower entrenchment, the magnitude of the dividends is 
also smaller. 
Finally, we have separated owners who are founder CEO and owners who have positions on 
the board. Our findings show that firms with founder owners who are solely CEO actually have 
less aggressive payout policies than general companies. First, this finding is of great importance 
to the academic research on dividend policies because one would believe that among the founder 
owners, the CEO would be one of the most involved. Second, we think this finding might be 
attributable to the fact that founders and owners mostly choose to operate solely as the CEO of 
their firms in the early growth stages. Consequently, this is a crucial time for both the long-term 
survival and success of the newly founded company. Accordingly, there is little room for large 
cash dividend payouts. Third, contrary to founder board members and other owners, the position 
as CEO (and managerial positions) is usually compensated with a decent salary. Thus dividends 
are not as important as a source of income for the founder-CEO as for other founders.  
As the company grows older and the founder has more tenure as an owner, it is natural for 
him to take on various positions on the board. In these cases we observe an alignment with 
Hypothesis 2 on operating founders. The ownership in combination with a psychological 
attachment results in the usage of dividends for tunneling purposes and/or as a compensating 
monitoring force. Accordingly, founder owners who are board members are associated with the 
absolutely most aggressive dividend payout policies. 
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
In this research paper we have investigated how involved firm owners affect cash dividend 
policies at varying levels of involvement. Our findings largely show that increased ownership 
involvement leads to more aggressive dividend payout policies, and connect this positive 
relationship to an increasing entrenchment effect as a result of high involvement, strong 
attachment and power. Thus, highly involved owners might choose to use dividends as a 
tunneling activity, compensating monitoring force or disciplining tool.  
Furthermore, we unexpectedly find that firms with founder owners who are solely CEO 
actually have less aggressive payout policies than other companies. This is a surprising but 
important result because it illustrates that the high involvement of founder-CEOs does not cause 
a more aggressive dividend policy. A likely explanation for this is that founders usually choose 
to operate solely as CEO only in the early growth stages of the firm, and that founder-CEOs are 
compensated with a decent salary compared to board members and other owners.  
To the best of our knowledge, all the findings in this study contribute significantly to the 
corporate finance literature on dividend policies, especially since the general research on the 
topic of ownership involvement and payouts show quite inconsistent results. Our research helps 
clarify the topic of corporate actions by giving some general guidelines to how involved firm 
owners treat cash dividend payouts.  
Since we study different people who are owners, founders, managers and board members, 
we must keep in mind that personal traits, such as risk aversion, culture and status, also affect the 
decision. Consequently, our findings can be attributed to an omitted variable bias. An example 
that could prove causality with our findings is undiversified owners who are dependent on high 
dividends for reasons related to personal financial situations. Additionally, we mainly argue that 
agency costs (entrenchment) constitute the main driver behind the aggressive payout policies of 
involved owners. However, other factors e.g. taxes, transaction costs and asymmetric 
information could also be important factors that have been neglected here. 
Even though our study provides some guidelines to how involved firm owners influence 
corporate dividend policies, the research area as a whole lack empirical consensus. Thus, more 
research on the topic is needed. A suggestion to other researchers is to include the voting power 
(or other omitted variables) of the involved owners in a similar study.   
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